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The modern process of amicus curiae participation is a form of political 
symbolism reflecting the Supreme Court’s irreconcilable role in American 
democracy as a quasi-representative policy-making institution.  Specifically, 
this political symbolism reassures the public, particularly vulnerable groups, 
of the Court’s democratic character.  Amicus participation dispels external 
public criticism that the Court is detached and indifferent to the public, 
without significantly undermining the Court’s independence.  Ultimately, the 
Court’s institutional legitimacy rests upon the dual pillars of independence 
and inclusion.  Amicus participation contributes significantly to the latter.  
Critics of the Court’s current open door policy to amicus participation fear 
that the lack of additional constraints governing the submission of amicus 
briefs encourages partisan excess, promotes judicial activism, and unduly 
burdens the Court.  However, the benefits to the Court and its multiple 
stakeholders outweigh these concerns.  This Article builds upon the existing 
legal literature by (i) exploring amicus participation’s value to multiple 
stakeholders, not simply the Court and (ii) highlighting the important link 
between amicus participation, political symbolism, and the Court’s 
institutional legitimacy. 
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 Picking Friends From the Crowd: Amicus  
Participation as Political Symbolism  
OMARI SCOTT SIMMONS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In other words, all the Court has done today, to borrow from another 
context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends.1 
 
The separation of governmental powers and a system of checks and 
balances to counter autocratic abuses within any branch of government are 
at the heart of democratic tradition in the United States.  In theory, the 
Supreme Court is expected to provide stability in the administration of 
justice ensuring some degree of both horizontal and vertical equity for the 
polity.2  For many groups and entities, the courts are the best, if not the 
only, government branch capable of guaranteeing substantive and 
procedural justice to all.3  For vulnerable groups, the court system, at least 
from a symbolic perspective, is the “great leveler.”4 
Unlike other branches of government, ascendancy to the Supreme 
                                                                                                                
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.  B.A., 1996, Wake Forest 
University; J.D., 1999, University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., 2001, University of Cambridge, Pembroke 
College.  I am grateful to Kami Chavis Simmons, Ronald Wright, John Korzen, and Shannon Gilreath 
for reviewing drafts of this Article and offering their insightful comments.  Any errors herein are my 
own.  I also wish to thank Sally Irvin, Gregory Kupka, Amy Willis, Meredith Pinson, Emile Thompson, 
and Azaria Tesfa for their valuable research assistance; and Wake Forest University School of Law for 
its generous support. 
1 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia J., dissenting). 
2 Horizontal equity is the equal treatment of equals.  An example of this principle is seen in the 
equal protection context, which demands that similarly situated persons receive like treatment.  See 
generally, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  Vertical equity, on the other hand, is disparate treatment on 
account of legitimate differences.  An example of vertical equity would be the heightened scrutiny 
afforded to racial and gender classifications in the equal protection context.  See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (“Our decisions . . . establish that the party seeking to 
uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing 
an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.”). 
3 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 8 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (asserting 
that systems of representation are most inclusive when they encourage the “perspectives of relatively 
marginalized or disadvantaged social groups to receive specific expression”).  Throughout this nation’s 
history, the Supreme Court has played a critical role in securing justice for groups that held little 
legislative weight or where political realities constrained the other branches of government from acting.  
A vivid example is the Warren Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 218 (1960).  For almost a decade, cases involving the 
2000 presidential election, affirmative action, capital punishment, sodomy laws as well as potential 
Court vacancies have all kept the Supreme Court thoroughly immersed in political discourse.  See, e.g., 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 566 (2003); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 313–14, 316 (2003); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100–01 
(2000). 
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Court is not conditioned upon electoral politics or constituency demands.  
The lifetime appointment of Justices, in theory, frees them from being 
accountable to any particular ruling regime or constituency.5  Thus, 
pluralistic and partisan politics should play a limited role in judicial 
decision making.  But, just how different is the Court from the legislative 
and the executive branches where organized interest groups mobilize to 
sway government outcomes?6  Undoubtedly, certain institutional 
similarities exist. 
The Supreme Court’s role in American democracy manifests a tension 
between the Court’s duty to adjudicate disputes between two parties, 
resolving the specific conflict before it, and its role to create law, settling 
disputes between circuits and answering novel legal questions.  By 
definition, every question the Supreme Court answers is either of 
constitutional significance, unanswered, or a source of confusion or 
disagreement between courts.7  A decision that says “party X prevails over 
party Y” simultaneously establishes victories and losses for others and 
implicitly affirms, provides further guidance, or overrules court decisions 
                                                                                                                
5 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the importance of permanent 
and independent judges in achieving and preserving justice). 
6 The debate surrounding the question of whether and/or how much politics affects judicial 
decision making is not new.  Proponents of legal formalism argue that the Supreme Court is not 
inherently political or subject to interest group pressures that plague the other branches of government.  
Instead, they envision an objective judiciary that is constrained by legal doctrine.  Legal realists, on the 
other hand, assert that ideology and contextual factors are a driving force behind judicial decision 
making, not simply doctrine.  See Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: ‘Things 
Ain’t What They Used to Be’, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 370 (2005) (providing a history of legal realism).  
Also, legal realists are most likely to contend that decision making is more about judicial activism as 
opposed to judicial restraint.  Notwithstanding, judges, irrespective of political party affiliation, 
ardently refute the assertion that political ideology trumps adherence to doctrine.  See Emerson H. 
Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 
229–30 (1999) (providing an empirical study of the effect of political ideology on judicial decision 
making).  Tiller and Cross acknowledge a partisan component of judging at the federal circuit court 
level but also recognize that doctrine matters as well.  Tiller and Cross are more concerned with 
eliminating the partisan component of judicial decision making.  Accordingly, they identify particular 
instances where doctrine is most likely to matter and then propose that circuit panels be divided along 
party lines rather than being randomly selected.  Tiller and Cross reason that the presence of a minority 
“whistleblower” has a disciplining effect on ideological decision making.  Tiller and Cross’s assertions 
have been challenged and, in some instances, mischaracterized by esteemed members of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals.  See Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 235 (1999) 
(“Although judges, as human beings, cannot help but be influenced by their life experiences, it is not 
fair to say that political philosophy is the invisible hand guiding all or even most appellate 
decisionmaking.”).  For example, Harry T. Edwards former Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit, inaccurately dubbed Tiller and Cross’s arguments as such:  “Where the authors 
might have one believe that judging is entirely political, I maintain, and always have maintained, that 
appellate judging is fundamentally a principled practice.”  Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision 
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1337–38 (1998).  Tiller and Cross, however, are not 
suggesting that judicial decision making is “entirely” political or unprincipled.  This reluctance to 
acknowledge the potential of partisan influence on the part of the judiciary is perhaps because any 
admission that judicial decision making is partisan implies that the decision making process is 
impugned by bias. 
7 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (providing considerations governing review of certiorari); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. III (vesting the Supreme Court with judiciary authority). 
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on other cases.  The Supreme Court cannot escape the reach of its 
decisions.  It functions as a proxy for the entire judicial system.  Although 
Supreme Court Justices are not elected like members of Congress, they 
nonetheless engage in law making.  This institutional fact has led 
commentators to assert that the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is inseparable 
from other governmental institutions in our society.8  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the Court seeks and accepts input from many sources—
particularly in the form of amicus briefs.9 
Justices cannot simply rely on the immediate case and the skill (or lack 
thereof) of the immediate parties.  Decisions are published 
pronouncements that must reflect good law and policy.10  The Court 
operates within a broader context of a “constitutional culture” that involves 
an ongoing conversation with non-judicial actors.11  The modern process of 
                                                                                                                
8 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 154 (1986) 
(“[T]he legitimacy of courts is inseparable from the legitimacy of other institutions of our society.”). 
9 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004) (“Amicus Curiae. . . . [Latin ‘friend of the 
court’]  A person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court 
to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.”). 
10 Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this unique dilemma: 
The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the Union are vested in the 
hands of seven judges.  Without their active co-operation the Constitution would be 
a dead letter: the Executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments 
of the legislative powers; the Legislature demands their protections from the designs 
of the Executive; they defend the Union from the disobedience of the States; the 
States from the exaggerated claims of the Union, the public interest against the 
interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting 
innovations of democracy.  Their power is enormous, but it is clothed in the 
authority of public opinion.  They are the all-powerful guardians of a people which 
respects law, but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular 
contempt.  The force of public opinion is the most intractable of agents, because its 
exact limits cannot be defined; and it is not less dangerous to exceed than to remain 
below the boundary prescribed. 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (Henry Reeve trans., Colonial Press 1900) 
(emphasis added); see also Linda Greenhouse, What Got into the Court? What Happens Next?, 57 ME. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (“But no great Supreme Court case is only a question of law.”).  De Tocqueville 
also believed that: 
Federal judges must not only be good citizens, and men possessed of that 
information and integrity which are indispensable to magistrates, but they must be 
statesmen—politicians, not unread in the signs of the times, not afraid to brave the 
obstacles which can be subdued nor slow to turn aside such encroaching elements as 
may threaten the supremacy of the Union and the obedience which is due to the 
laws. 
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 150. 
11 See Robert C. Post, Foreword, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (2003) (noting that “constitutional law emerges from an ongoing 
dialectic between constitutional culture and the institutional practices of constitutional adjudication”).  
Public perception and the legitimacy of the court are valid concerns as the following comments 
illustrate: 
Indeed, the courts cannot do their job of fair and just adjudication of disputes 
without the trust and faith of the community, the bar, and even their own employees.  
The courts depend on the cooperation and participation of people from all three 
communities.  If significant parts of those communities mistrust the impartiality of 
the courts, they will not provide the cooperation, participation, and support the 
system needs to function properly. 
It is not enough for the courts to be just; they must also be perceived to be just.  
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amicus curiae participation is a form of political symbolism reflecting the 
Court’s irreconcilable role in American democracy as a quasi-
representative policy making institution.  Specifically, the political 
symbolism of amicus curiae participation reassures the public, particularly 
vulnerable groups, of the Court’s democratic character.  Amicus 
participation dispels external public criticism that the Court is detached and 
indifferent to the public, without significantly undermining the Court’s 
independence.  Ultimately, the Court’s institutional legitimacy rests upon 
the dual pillars of independence and inclusion.  Amicus participation 
contributes significantly to the latter. 
Critics of the Court’s current open door policy to amicus participation 
fear that the lack of additional constraints governing the submission of 
amicus briefs encourages partisan excess, promotes judicial activism, and 
unduly burdens the Supreme Court.12  However, the benefits to the Court 
and its multiple stakeholders outweigh these concerns.  Amicus 
participation has received significant scholarly treatment in the legal and 
political science literature.  Most of this literature either attempts to 
                                                                                                                
Otherwise, the courts lose legitimacy as dispute resolvers and instead may be 
perceived as irrelevant or, worse, as instruments of oppression.  The courts must, 
therefore, do more than simply avoid legally actionable bias.  They must make 
certain that members of the three communities believe both that the courts are fair 
and that they will be treated equally when they enter the courthouse. 
Todd D. Peterson, Studying the Impact of Race and Ethnicity in the Federal Courts, 64 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 173, 176 (1996). 
12 This risk is underscored by evidence and arguments presented in amicus briefs that have not 
been challenged through the litigation process and are not subject to the same evidentiary safeguards as 
the parties’ briefs.  In Akins v. Federal Election Commission, the D.C. Circuit expressed its disapproval 
of a Supreme Court action that relied on an argument presented by an amici and not the immediate 
parties: 
I recognize that the Supreme Court has moved pretty far from traditional notions of 
judicial restraint that confine courts to issues presented by the parties . . . but I think 
this decision represents another large step in that regrettable process insofar as it was 
an amicus—an amicus who had not appeared until the case reached the Supreme 
Court—who made the dispositive argument, one which was never once made before 
us. 
Akins v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 146 F.3d 1049, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 
518 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that no organizations seek the truth besides the 
Court); Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court O.T. 1982, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 628, 647 (1983) (asserting amicus briefs are “a waste of time, effort, and money in a 
useless function”).  Judge Richard Posner cites three limited instances in which amicus submissions 
should be permissible: (i) where “a party is not represented competently or is not represented at all”; 
(ii) where “the amicus has an interest in  some other case that may be affected by the decision in the 
present case”; and (iii) where “the amicus has unique information or perspective that can help the court 
beyond the help that the lawyers of the parties can provide.”  Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997). 
Most critics of amicus participation equate the value of amicus participation solely with the 
informational value it offers to Justices rendering decisions.  These commentators, however, should 
consider adopting a more expansive approach to valuing amicus participation that takes into account 
multiple constituencies and embraces a broader understanding of the impact of symbolic reassurance on 
the Court’s legitimacy.  See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 315, 357 (2008) (“Increased amicus participation will have a democratizing influence on the 
litigation process . . . .”  Moreover, “it is often more cost effective for social movements to make their 
voices heard as amicus parties than as parties bringing litigation.”). 
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anecdotally illustrate the impact of amicus briefs or empirically validate 
the impact of amicus briefs on judicial decision making.13  This Article 
builds upon this valuable literature by (i) exploring amicus participation’s 
value to multiple stakeholders, not simply the Court and (ii) highlighting 
the important link between amicus participation, political symbolism, and 
the Court’s legitimacy. 
Part II of this Article provides historical background on amicus curiae 
participation before the Supreme Court and identifies factors that have 
contributed to its extensive use and transformation into a symbolic 
mechanism reflecting democratic inclusion. 
Part III asserts modern amicus participation is a form of political 
symbolism that reassures the public―particularly vulnerable groups―of 
the Supreme Court’s democratic character.  This is especially true in cases 
having broad social impact and political salience, such as cases involving 
capital punishment, affirmative action, free speech, and assisted suicide.  In 
this context, amicus participation provides a link between the Supreme 
Court and the polity, reinforcing the Court’s institutional legitimacy.  
Amicus participation illustrates that inclusion, like independence, is a key 
pillar upon which the Court’s institutional legitimacy rests. 
Part IV provides an expansive view of the value of modern amicus 
participation to various stakeholders—the immediate parties, the Court, 
and the amici.  The current legal literature does not incorporate the value 
amicus participation provides to the Court’s various constituencies, namely 
the parties and the amici.  Limiting the value analysis to the Court 
exclusively, while excluding other constituencies, understates the value of 
modern amicus participation. 
Part V examines, at an aggregate level, the different entities that 
participate as amici before the Supreme Court.  These diverse group 
dynamics reflect the Court’s important societal function as a quasi-
representative body and how the Court’s inclusionary function reinforces 
                                                                                                                
13 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who 
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 784 (Aug. 1990); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 
(2000); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 
(1963); Kelly Lynch, Best Friends?  Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Briefs, 20 J.L. & 
POL. 33, 49 (2004) (analyzing the effectiveness of amicus briefs from the perspective of Supreme Court 
clerks); Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein, Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Years, 89 JUDICATURE 127, 
129–32 (Nov.–Dec. 2005).  For example, Kearney and Merrill interpret their empirical evidence 
concerning amicus briefs as an indication of the validity of certain judicial decision making models, 
i.e., the legal model, attitudinal model, and interest group theory of the judicial process.  See id.  
Ultimately, they suggest that there is more empirical support for the legal model, than for the other 
decision making models.  See id.  Kearney and Merrill admittedly rely on three overly-simplistic 
models for judicial decision making, which as defined, do not contemplate that judicial decision 
making may employ a hybridized approach requiring a mixture of the models; or that certain types of 
cases (e.g., capital punishment, reproductive rights, voting rights, and affirmative action) and other 
contextual factors will determine the level of influence a particular decision making model may indeed 
have on swaying outcomes.  Minus actual citation of amicus briefs such validation is difficult due to 
the number of intervening variables. 
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its institutional legitimacy. 
Part VI analyzes the Supreme Court’s decisions in Washington v. 
Glucksberg and Roper v. Simmons, which exemplify the types of 
politically salient cases where the Court symbolizes a quasi-representative 
body.14  These examples provide a vivid illustration of the dynamics of 
amicus participation, the diverse interests involved, the types of 
argumentation employed, and the discursive exchange of perspectives.  In 
this section, a deeper content-based analysis of the amicus briefs further 
reveals how the Court engages non-judicial actors in an ongoing dialogue. 
Ultimately, this Article contends that modern amicus participation is a 
valuable symbolic mechanism reflecting democratic inclusion that, inter 
alia, provides a dotted line between the Court and the polity.  This link 
reinforces the Court’s institutional legitimacy.  Consequently, efforts to 
restrict amici before the Court rather than encourage greater participation 
via the present “open door” policy should be approached with caution. 
II.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMICUS PARTICIPATION 
A.  Historical Beginnings 
The submission of amicus briefs dates back as far as ancient Rome.15  
Under the English common law system, amici provided the courts with 
impartial legal information beyond the court’s expertise or immediate 
knowledge.16  Whereas the name amicus curiae or “friend of the court” 
described the function of amici at common law, today, some argue that the 
more apt description of amicus participation before the Supreme Court is 
“friend of a party.”17  Today, the amicus brief “as a form of information 
gathering may provide the judicial counterpart of lobbying and 
congressional hearings in the legislative process.”18  Amicus participation 
is just one of several mechanisms used by interest groups to influence 
government decision making.19 
                                                                                                                
14 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see 
also infra Part VI. 
15 See Krislov, supra note 13, at 694. 
16 See Madeleine Schachter, The Utility of Pro Bono Representation of U.S.-Based Amicus Curiae 
in Non-U.S. and Multi-National Courts as a Means of Advancing the Public Interest, 28 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 88, 90 (2004) (“[T]he amicus submission originally was intended to provide a court with 
important legal information that was beyond its notice or expertise . . . .”); Krislov, supra note 13, at 
694–95. 
17 Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063 (explaining that the “term ‘amicus curiae’ means friend of the court not 
friend of a party”); see also Michael J. Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe?  The Limits of 
Friendship in American Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 6 (2000). 
18 Krislov, supra note 13, at 717. 
19 See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1123 (1988) [hereinafter Caldeira & Wright, Organized 
Interests].  Whereas interest group lobbying appears most prominently at the legislative level, interest 
groups actively lobby to alter the composition of the Supreme Court via the judicial appointments 
process and participate as amici. 
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Historically, the increased use of amicus briefs mirrored a “change in 
tactics and structure of interest articulation in American politics as a whole 
that occurred during the latter quarter of the nineteenth century.”20  This 
period saw interest group activity transform “from personal, face-to-face 
contacts (including corruption) to impersonal, organized, and systematic, 
bureaucratically undertaken and oriented activity.”21  The advantages 
accruing to “bureaucratically sophisticated groups in other political arenas” 
became evident in the judicial context as well.22  These interest groups 
were characterized by their ability to mobilize resources, their use of 
expertise, their flexibility to respond quickly before policy was set, and 
their sensitivity to raising new issues.23  Other influences on the use of 
amicus briefs included the growth of administrative agencies, the growth 
of the welfare state, and the government’s increased intervention in broad 
social problems such as school desegregation, racial covenants, and 
redistricting legislation.24  During the initial decades of the twentieth 
century, amici filed briefs in only 10% of cases before the Supreme 
Court.25  From 1986 through 1995, amici filed briefs in 85% of the Court’s 
argued cases.26  Between 1945 and 1995, the number of amicus brief 
filings increased by more than 800%, while the numbers of cases decided 
on the merits did not increase.27  Between 1996 and 2003, at least one 
amicus brief was filed in 95% of cases.28 
Some of the first private interest groups to effectively use the 
opportunity for broader access that amicus briefs provided included labor 
unions, “racial minority groups, securities and insurance interests, railroad 
interests, and miscellaneous groups under severe attack, notably the liquor 
interests in the first quarter of th[e] twentieth century.”29  These groups 
perhaps selected this new channel of “self-protection or aggrandizement” 
due to “[s]heer familiarity with the intricacies of the existing system, 
strong dissatisfaction with it, and relative desperation.”30  Yet, widespread 
use by civil rights organizations such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) and the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (“NAACP”) drew public attention to the issue of amicus 
                                                                                                                
20 Krislov, supra note 13, at 704. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 704–05. 
24 Id. at 706. 
25 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 744. 
26 See id. at 744, 753. 
27 See id. at 749.  Actual citations and quotations of amici in Court opinions may suggest some 
degree of growing impact or value to the Court.  Supreme Court citation and quotation of amicus briefs 
have undoubtedly increased over the past fifty years.  Id. at 757–58.  Thirty-seven percent of cases 
between 1986–95 cited amici.  Over the same period, amici were quoted at a rate of fifteen percent, 
which was double the amount for the previous three decades.  Id. at 757–59. 
28 Owens & Epstein, supra note 13, at 129 fig. 1. 
29 Id.; see also Krislov, supra note 13, at 707. 
30 Id. 
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participation.31  The NAACP (particularly the Legal Defense Fund 
(“LDF”)), almost since its inception, has participated as amicus curiae in 
Supreme Court litigation.32  The NAACP “[i]n the face of failures to gain 
concessions from Congress, due in large part to the power wielded by the 
Southern Delegation, particularly in the Senate,” turned to the judiciary 
where they experienced significant success.33  NAACP victories altered the 
doctrinal development of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and 
elevated the legal status of African Americans.34  Whether expanding the 
rights of blacks to vote,35 preventing the systemic exclusion of blacks from 
juries,36 or desegregating public schools,37 litigation became the primary 
mechanism for championing minority rights that were difficult to obtain in 
other political venues.  Not surprisingly, increased amicus participation 
ensued. 
The coordination among primary litigants and amici was an essential 
aspect of the NAACP’s litigation strategy.38  The Restrictive Covenant 
Cases of 1948 are a classic example of amicus participation reflecting the 
norm of democratic inclusion.39  In those cases, amicus briefs on behalf of 
American Indian groups, Japanese American groups, Jewish American 
groups, religious organizations, labor organizations, and others supported 
the black litigants, who were represented by the NAACP LDF lawyers.40 
The extensive use of amicus briefs and extralegal facts in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence can be attributed, in part, to a shift from exclusive 
                                                                                                                
31 See id. at 709 (“[I]t was the use of [amicus briefs] by civil rights organizations which drew 
widespread public attention.”); see also Clement E. Vose, NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6 
W. RES. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (1955) (analyzing NAACP strategy in the Restrictive Covenant Cases of 
1948).  The ACLU filed briefs in sixteen percent of all cases from 1986 to 1995.  Kearney & Merrill, 
supra note 13, at 753 n.25.  During the same period, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) also appeared frequently before the Court in over six percent of 
the cases.  Id. 
32 Krislov, supra note 13, at 707; see also Vose, supra note 31, at 102 (“From 1915 to January, 
1948, when the Restrictive Covenant Cases were argued, 23 of 25 sponsored cases were won by the 
Association.”).  “Since 1939 the NAACP has, strictly speaking, devoted itself to legislative activities 
while, a separate organization, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., has had the 
exclusive task of conducting legal action.”  Id. at 103. 
33 Id. at 102. 
34 Id. 
35 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 539–41 (1927); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 
353–54, 361 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 277 (1939). 
36 See Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395 
(1935). 
37 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
38 See Vose, supra note 31, at 134 (discussing the NAACP’s strategy of limiting the number of 
briefs filed in a particular case so as not to flood the Court with too many redundant arguments). 
39 See id. at 141–43 (discussing participation in the Restrictive Covenants Cases by cultural 
associations, labor groups, religious organizations, and liberal groups). 
40 Id. at 133–34.  In the famous Grandfather Clause case, Guinn v. United States, the NAACP 
participated as amici and justified its participation on the following grounds:  “[T]he vital importance 
of these questions to every citizen of the United States, whether white or colored, seems amply to 
warrant submission of this brief.”  See Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae at 2, Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (No. 96).  The brief is in the microfiche containing Supreme Court cases 
and briefs. 
 2009] PICKING FRIENDS FROM THE CROWD 195 
reliance on the dominant paradigm of legal formalism during the 
nineteenth century to a greater influence of legal realism during the first 
half of the twentieth century.41  Legal realists rejected formalism and tried 
to convey how law operated in social, political, and economic contexts.42  
As the Court became more accepting of extra-legal facts and social science 
evidence, progressive groups began to use amicus briefs to lobby the Court 
in politically charged cases such as those involving social legislation and 
desegregation.43  The Warren Court in Brown was one of the first courts to 
use social science data extensively.  In the wake of Brown, the submission 
of extra-legal evidence via amicus participation increased.44 
B.  Modern Amicus Participation 
Former Justice Felix Frankfurter argued for the restrictive use of 
amicus participation within the confines of the adversary system.45  
Frankfurter did not want to see the Court exploited or used as soapbox for 
interest group activity.46  This narrow view of amicus participation and the 
adversarial system would support limiting the number of amici.  
Alternatively, Justice Hugo Black supported broadening amicus 
participation to a wide array of groups.47  Black’s broader vision of the 
adversarial system allowed for extensive participation by amici—
acknowledging that cases before the Court affected many people beyond 
the immediate parties.48  Under Black’s approach, the Court acts in a quasi-
representative capacity.  Today, Supreme Court rules (or more accurately 
the lax enforcement of those rules) reflect Black’s vision of amicus 
participation. 
Presently, the Supreme Court allows for virtually unlimited amicus 
participation.49  Amicus participation may take place at two stages in the 
                                                                                                                
41 See Macaulay, supra note 6, at 366–403 (describing this evolution in detail). 
42 See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:  Selective 
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 100–03 (1993) (describing the importance of social 
context to legal realism); Hazard, supra note 8, at 171–72 (“[W]hether moderate or radical, realism 
theorized that a decision was not compelled by precedent, but expressed a choice on the part of the 
judges who made the decision.”). 
43 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 108–10.  The Committee of Law Teachers Against 
Segregation in Legal Education filed a brief urging the Court to desegregate the nation’s schools in 
Sweatt v. Painter.  Brief for the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44), 1950 WL 
78683; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 110 n.85. 
44 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 297 (1955) (listing seven amicus briefs). 
45 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 784; Krislov, supra note 13, at 717. 
46 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 784. 
47 See Krislov, supra note 13, at 717 (“[T]o the extent that Mr. Justice Black resists such 
restraints, he is supporting a broadening of the interests likely to come before the Court and the issues 
presented to it for resolution.”). 
48 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 784–85 (quoting Justice Black:  “‘I think the public 
interest and judicial administration would be better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule 
against amicus curiae briefs.’”). 
49 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 761–65 (discussing the history of the liberal filing 
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Supreme Court litigation process—the agenda setting stage (i.e., decisions 
on petitions for writs of certiorari and jurisdictional statements) and at the 
merits stage.50  Supreme Court rules require organizations and individuals 
that wish to participate as amici to obtain permission from both parties 
involved in the litigation.51  If either party refuses, the individual or entity 
wishing to participate must file a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae 
brief to the Supreme Court.52  On the other hand, governmental entities 
such as the Solicitor General and individual states do not need the 
permission of either party.53  Although the Court has power to limit amicus 
participation by denying motions for leave to file, it seldom exercises this 
discretionary power despite an already heavy workload.54  Supreme Court 
Rule 37.1 articulates the purpose and desired contents of an amicus brief:  
“An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant 
matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of 
considerable help to the Court.  An amicus curiae brief that does not serve 
this purpose burdens Court, and its filing is not favored.”55  Supreme Court 
rules expressly recognize both the utility and the excess of amicus briefs.56  
Some commentators argue that too much amicus participation and over-
reliance on such briefs may unfairly disadvantage the immediate parties to 
the litigation.57  Despite these concerns, “[t]he Supreme Court’s continued 
willingness to receive this rising tide of briefs from not-so-disinterested 
                                                                                                                
requirements and the open door approach to amici). 
50 SUP. CT. R. 37.2–37.3; see also Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 784 (“These rules apply to 
amicus briefs on petitions for [certiorari] and jurisdictional statements as well as to briefs on decisions 
on the merits.”). 
51  See SUP. CT. R. 37.2(a), 37.3(a). 
52 See SUP. CT. R. 37.2(b), 37.3(b). 
53 Supreme Court Rule 37.4 provides that: 
No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if the brief is 
presented on behalf of the United States by the Solicitor General; on behalf of any 
agency of the United States allowed by law to appear before this Court when 
submitted by the agency’s authorized legal representative; on behalf of a State, 
Commonwealth, Territory, or Possession when submitted by its Attorney General; 
or on behalf of a city, county, town, or similar entity when submitted by its 
authorized law officer. 
SUP. CT. R. 37.4.  Moreover, Supreme Court Rule 37.6 requires amici other than governmental entities 
to: 
[I]ndicate whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part . . . and 
shall identify every person or entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or 
its counsel, who made such a monetary contribution.  The disclosure shall be made 
in the first footnote on the first page of text. 
SUP. CT. R. 37.6.  Supreme Court rules explicitly distinguish between governmental and non-
governmental entities by placing more stringent requirements on non-governmental amici.  Supreme 
Court Rule 37.6 reflects the court’s interest in evaluating bias on the part of amici. 
54 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 785.  Between 1969 and 1981 the Court denied only 91 of 
832 motions to file for leave to file an amicus curiae.  Id. 
55 SUP. CT. R. 37.1. 
56 Tony Mauro, Bench Pressed, AMERICAN LAW., Apr. 15, 2005, available at http://www.law. 
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1113296708400 (quoting statements by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg concerning amicus participation). 
57 See Akins v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 146 F.3d 1049, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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third parties is, in our view, tacit recognition that most matters before the 
justices have vast social, political, and economic ramifications—far 
beyond the interest of the immediate parties.”58  Just as interest groups 
have mobilized in Congress, they are lobbying before the Supreme Court 
as amici.59 
Although amici are represented in all types of Supreme Court 
litigation, they are most visible in cases that involve contentious and 
politically salient issues like abortion, eminent domain, free speech, capital 
punishment, and affirmative action.60  These cases generate unusually large 
numbers of amicus briefs and political fervor.61   This is one of the most 
important findings from an empirical survey conducted by Joseph Kearney 
and Thomas Merrill.62  This finding indicates that in politically salient 
cases, the Court operates most like a quasi-representative body and reflects 
the norm of democratic inclusion.63  Washington v. Glucksberg and Roper 
v. Simmons, which are explored in greater detail in Part VI, fall into this 
category of cases.64  
III.  AMICUS PARTICIPATION AS SYMBOLIC REASSURANCE                            
OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION 
A.  Symbolic Reassurance 
Democratic procedures serve as a proxy for legitimacy.  Specifically, 
amicus curiae participation provides symbolic reassurance of the Court’s 
receptiveness to the norm of democratic inclusion.  In this sense, “men 
may dislike a winning candidate, law, or judge’s decision, yet be reassured 
by the forms of the election, legislature, or the court.”65  In the judicial 
context, democratic inclusion provides that persons impacted by decisions 
should participate in the lawmaking process.  The routinization 
                                                                                                                
58 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 783. 
59 Although the actual degree of influence amicus briefs have is difficult to quantify, the lofty 
expense and resources required in filing such briefs, at a minimum, suggests that groups filing amicus 
briefs believe they have some instrumental impact.  Some commentators suggest that the cost of filing 
an amicus brief can range from $15,000 to $60,000.  See Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra 
note 19, at 1112; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 801–19 (examining the impact of amici 
briefs through the legal model, which predicts that the Court is influenced by briefs that present 
especially valued information but not by briefs that are merely repetitive of the parties’ briefs). 
60 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 754–56 (categorizing the cases since 1970 that have 
generated twenty or more amicus briefs). 
61 Id. 
62 See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13. 
63 Less salient political issues such as business and market regulation, although important, do not 
generate the same attention from amici.  Ironically, there is anecdotal evidence that the Court finds 
amicus briefs exploring technical areas of the law more useful than constitutional arguments where the 
Court has ample expertise.  See Lynch, supra note 13, at 42.  From the Court’s perspective, briefs filed 
in less politically salient cases might address technical issues where the Court lacks expertise. 
64 For a discussion of the significance of these cases within the scope of this Article, see infra Part 
VI. 
65 MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 12 (1985). 
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characteristic of modern amicus participation creates the impression, 
whether actual or perceived, that groups have the opportunity to weigh in 
on judicial decisions that have broad social and political ramifications.  
Arguably, the Supreme Court and its decisions—with majority, concurring, 
and dissenting opinions along with supporting rationale, deserve greater 
respect than pronouncements from other government branches whose 
procedures may appear more ad hoc, arbitrary, less transparent, and less 
independent.  The process of amicus curiae participation provides an 
additional layer of legitimacy and illustrates that the Court’s “judicial 
authority might best be reconceived as a relationship of trust that courts 
forge with the American people.”66  In this sense, the Court’s multiple 
constituencies coalesce around procedures that, irrespective of their 
tangible impact, symbolize elements of fairness.  From this perspective, the 
Court’s legitimacy is viewed primarily through a procedural lens rather 
than a substantive one.  Yet, despite much disagreement concerning the 
shape of substantive judicial outcomes, democratic procedures add to the 
legitimacy—or promote the acquiescence—of the Court’s rulings. 
Democratic features in the judicial context are especially compelling 
because they provide symbolic reassurance for threatened or vulnerable 
groups who lack political capital in other venues such as Congress where 
political spoils go to the well-funded and well-organized.  Democratic 
theorists espouse the value of citizen participation in the “design and 
implementation of policies that affect them.”67  This value includes not 
only the prospect of better substantive legal outcomes via discursive 
debate, but also the enhanced legitimacy of such reforms.  Amicus 
participation provides a “deliberative forum” for groups excluded from the 
legislative process.68  The absence or retraction of this participatory 
mechanism might result in discontent and exclusion. 
The fair adjudication of cases alone will not always enhance the 
Court’s legitimacy. The Supreme Court’s legitimacy hinges upon the 
perception among multiple constituencies.  Without a favorable perception 
among the polity, the Supreme Court loses it credibility as an arbiter of 
disputes or, even worse, becomes viewed as an agent of oppression.69  And 
“[s]ince most societies claim to offer their citizens equal justice under the 
law, the courts are presumed repositories of equality and the solemn fora 
for the just adjudication of the law without regard to race, creed, color, 
appearance, or any other categorical distinction.”70  Therefore, the 
symbolism of broad amicus participation reinforces the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                
66 Post, supra note 11, at 11. 
67 William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal 
Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 175 (2004) (describing associative democracy). 
68 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 42 (1996). 
69 See Peterson, supra note 11, at 176 (noting the importance of the courts being perceived as 
just). 
70 A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES OF FREEDOM 130 (1996). 
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institutional legitimacy. 
Despite the benefits of symbolism, fair questions remain as to whether 
(i) there is a gap between democratic symbolism and democratic reality, 
and (ii) if so, does this present a problem?  The answer to the first question 
is clearly yes, but the degree of discrepancy may also be relevant.  The 
answer to the second question is less certain.  One can make a credible 
argument that affected vulnerable groups are not adequately represented by 
amici especially in less politically salient cases.  However, a strong 
argument can be made that amici adequately reflect vulnerable group 
interests especially when one acknowledges the historical use of amicus 
participation by civil rights organizations.  Without question, amicus 
participation provides real democratic benefits to vulnerable groups.  
Nonetheless, there is a greater discrepancy between the Court’s democratic 
symbolism and democratic reality when compared to other branches of 
government (e.g., Congress) characterized by electoral politics.  Yet, the 
greater discrepancy in the judicial context should be viewed in a positive 
light because the Court’s institutional legitimacy is also a function of its 
independence that would be undermined if the same degree of interest 
group influence prevailed.  Moreover, the dichotomy between real 
democratic benefits versus symbolic ones may be overstated because 
legitimacy is determined from the observer’s socially constructed vantage 
point.71  In other words, perception, to a large degree, is reality.  Fair and 
independent adjudication is a necessity, but not a sufficient condition for 
the Court’s legitimacy.  The Court is unavoidably an independent body and 
a political actor.  And the Court’s institutional legitimacy rests on the dual 
pillars of inclusion and independence. 
B.  Defining Legitimacy 
Few legal scholars dispute the importance of legitimacy and even 
fewer can define it in a concise manner.72  Legitimacy is a complex 
                                                                                                                
71 EDELMAN, supra note 65, at 200. 
72 Although few legal scholars dispute the importance of “legitimacy,” most scholars have 
difficulty adequately defining legitimacy in a concise manner.  Social scientists have tried to equate 
legitimacy with public opinion surveys; however, other scholars contend that such surveys oversimplify 
the complex nature of legitimacy.  Moreover, some commentators assert that the general public is not 
well informed of the Court’s practices and as a result opinion surveys may be misleading.  See Richard 
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1825–26 (2005) (discussing the 
public’s lack of “sufficient information” about the judiciary).  In other words, being a legitimate 
institution does not mean people feel that the Justices are currently doing a good job.  Richard Fallon 
asserts that legitimacy has three separate dimensions: legal, sociological, and moral.  See generally id.; 
see also David A. Strauss, Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1866 (2005) (“To 
question the legitimacy of something—a constitution, a statute, a legal regime—is to question whether 
it is entitled to obedience.”).  Under Fallon’s framework, legal legitimacy is gauged by consistency 
with legal norms.  A sociologically legitimate decision would be a decision that is accepted as 
deserving respect, obedience, or acquiescence.  Moral legitimacy is a function of consistency with 
moral norms.  See Fallon, supra, at 1794–96.  Even within these three categories, Fallon identifies 
subcategories that reflect the complex nature of legitimacy.  For example, sociological legitimacy has 
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concept, and its measurement is at best a speculative exercise.  Despite 
measurement difficulties and competing views concerning legitimacy, this 
Article maintains that the Court’s institutional legitimacy is enhanced by 
broad amicus participation—especially in politically-charged cases.73  For 
purposes of this Article, to challenge the legitimacy of the Supreme Court 
“is to question whether it is entitled to obedience.”74  In this sense, the 
Supreme Court is a legitimate institution because of diffuse support and the 
general public’s belief that it is a trustworthy decision maker whose rulings 
deserve to be obeyed.75  This perception, in part, stems from procedures 
preserving the Court’s independence.  Yet the effective functioning of 
political institutions also requires the goodwill of the public. 
Unlike Congress and the President, the Supreme Court lacks a formal 
ongoing connection to the electorate.76  This suggests that the Court “must 
depend to an extraordinary extent on the confidence, or at least the 
acquiescence, of the public.”77  Despite the formal lack of electoral 
                                                                                                                
three subcategories: (i) institutional legitimacy, i.e., the diffuse public belief that the court is a 
trustworthy decision maker whose rulings deserve obedience; (ii) substantive legitimacy, i.e., public 
belief that a decision is substantively correct that may vary from group to group; and (iii) authoritative 
legitimacy, i.e., a public belief that decisions ought to be obeyed or deserve acquiescence.  See id. at 
1828.  Despite considerable categorization, Fallon acknowledges the limits of sorting legitimacy into 
neat linguistic categories and how certain categories may be interrelated.  His analysis recognizes that a 
decision may be legally correct, but morally illegitimate or vice versa.  Nearly twenty years before 
Fallon’s legitimacy analysis, Geoffrey Hazard identified four separate aspects of legitimacy: (i) legal 
precedent; (ii) right-outcome; (iii) legal realism; and (iv) legal process.  See Hazard, supra note 8, at 
161–62.  Under Hazard’s framework, legal precedent asserts that judicial decisions are legitimate 
insofar as they are consistent with precedent.  A legal realism basis of legitimacy maintains that 
reference to the text of a decision should be augmented by the political, social, and economic 
consequences of a decision.  See id. at 171.  The right outcome basis of legitimacy rests in the Justices’ 
awareness of their own political viability.  The legal process basis for legitimacy can be contrasted with 
the legislative process because there is no “log rolling, pork barreling, and substantive compromise” 
with the Court’s interpretative practices and procedures.  Id. at 183. 
73 From another perspective, legitimacy may reflect the belief that particular decisions of the 
Court are substantively correct.  Substantive legitimacy, however, may vary from group to group, case 
to case, and methodology to methodology.  Some fear broad amicus participation and subsequent 
reliance upon it may increase the risk that a form of judicial activism will result displacing legal 
doctrine.  A study reported a negative relationship between judicial activism—as measured by the 
number of statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court—and public confidence.  See Gregory A. 
Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1223 (1986) (stating that the “public responds in a negative fashion to 
judicial negations of congressional statutes”).  The question of whether the invalidation of a statute 
reflects judicial activism is a separate issue not argued here. 
Thus, one could argue that the Court’s legitimacy should be gauged according to its adherence to 
legal doctrine and precedent.  But, one could also claim a decision is legitimate because its decisions 
reflected legal realism and were augmented by the consideration of circumstantial factors like 
economics and politics.  See Hazard, supra note 8, at 171–72.  Accordingly, “[t]here is too much 
controversy among legal elites, and too little informed endorsement among the mass public, to warrant 
strong claims of legal legitimacy (as opposed to weak or disputable ones) for the interpretive 
methodologies that substantially define the judicial role.”  Fallon, supra note 72, at 1827. 
74 Strauss, supra note 72, at 1866. 
75 See Fallon, supra note 72, at 1828. 
76 One must, however, acknowledge the link, albeit tenuous, between the public and the Supreme 
Court appointment and confirmation process. 
77 Caldeira, supra note 73, at 1209. 
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pressures to provide democratic legitimacy, the Court has traditionally 
fared well “in the estimations of the public, especially in comparison with 
other political institutions.”78  The positive perception is perhaps due to the 
Court’s independence.  But, amicus participation also heightens the 
Court’s legitimacy through allowing participation of interested third parties 
and providing a dotted-line link to the electorate.  Some political theorists 
contend that “[t]he normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends 
on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the 
decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the 
outcomes.”79  The large number of amicus briefs filed in politically-
charged cases as well as the actual content of the arguments raised within 
the briefs illustrate how “interest group amici may genuinely believe that 
the court responds to the principles of democratic rule.”80  In this sense, the 
Supreme Court engages in a continuous dialogue and exchange with 
various constituencies via amicus participation and its opinions.  Enhanced 
Supreme Court legitimacy as a matter of democratic inclusion may provide 
the strongest support for Justice Black’s vision of broad amicus 
participation.81 
The Court’s role in American democracy demands some knowledge of 
public forces and opinion—especially when Justices share policy-making 
authority with elected politicians.82  Justices may consider the prospect of 
being overridden or ineffective enforcement by the other branches of 
government.83  Therefore, “[J]ustices who wish to exert authority over the 
direction of American life will anticipate actions of the other branches of 
government.”84  In addition, some scholars argue that the Court will avoid 
public defeat that would undermine its institutional authority—and as a 
result compromise to maintain the institution’s public authority.85  This 
does not suggest, however, that the Court pays attention or responds to 
public demands like elected officials.  Instead, the Court assumes a less 
dynamic, more symbolic quasi-representative function. 
Although useful, public opinion is an inadequate proxy for legitimacy 
because it may oversimplify the complex and nuanced concept of 
legitimacy.  For example, the public may disagree with a particular 
decision, but nonetheless acquiesce and obey the decision out of respect for 
                                                                                                                
78 Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 635 (1992).  “Even during the 1960’s, when support for other 
institutions plummeted, public evaluations of the Court remained relatively high.”  Id.  Public 
confidence, however, may not be an adequate proxy for legitimacy. 
79 See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
80 Paul Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation 
in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 807, 812 (2004). 
81 See supra Part II.B. (discussing modern amicus participation). 
82 See James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543, 555 (1995). 
83 See id. 
84 Id. 
85 Public opinion also plays a role in the appointment and confirmation process.  See id. 
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the institution.  Moreover, the mass public is not that familiar with the 
Court and its interpretive practices.86  Whereas public opinion may vary 
widely, the Court’s institutional legitimacy is more static.87 
The Supreme Court is a proxy for the entire U.S. judicial system and 
therefore an integral part of American democracy.  As a matter of 
constitutional principle the Court “[m]ust be beyond politics,” but it is 
unavoidably a political institution.88  The Court’s legitimacy rests with 
multiple constituencies and stakeholders.  Consequently, the symbolic role 
of amicus participation is crucial because “more amicus participation may 
also increase the faith in the judicial system [and government] that is 
eroding in some quarters today.”89  Despite its imperfections, amicus 
participation is beneficial to advocating the public interest90 and promoting 
the norm of democratic inclusion, which is a crucial element of the 
democratic ideal.91 
IV.  THE VALUE OF AMICUS BRIEFS92 
The existing literature on amicus participation embraces a restrictive 
view on the value of amicus participation by correlating the value of 
amicus participation to the impact it has on assisting judges rendering a 
decision.93  Adopting a broader perspective, this Article contends that such 
a restrictive view may both understate and oversimplify the value of 
amicus participation to the Supreme Court’s multiple constituencies (e.g., 
the parties, the amici, and the Justices).  Accordingly, any discussion of 
reforming amicus participation before the Supreme Court (i.e., limiting 
access) should contemplate a more expansive view of value that considers 
amicus participation’s symbolic reassurance of constituents and its 
preservation of institutional legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                
86 See id. at 1825–26. 
87 See Fallon, supra note 72, at 1827–29. 
88 Hazard, supra note 8, at 157.  According to Hazard, the Court’s role reflects an irreconcilable 
contradiction between constitutional principle and institutional fact.  The constitutional principle is that 
the Court should be independent from primary political authority or should be beyond politics.  The 
institutional fact is that the Court makes laws as well as applies them.  The amicus brief is a crude 
device that has morphed into a multi-purpose instrument that helps reconcile the Court’s role as an 
independent body and political actor.  See id. at 153–57. 
89 Garcia, supra note 12, at 358. 
90 See Schachter, supra note 16, at 143–44 (discussing the positive effect of amicus representation 
on unrepresented and under privileged parties). 
91 See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 125. 
92 Part IV focuses on amicus participation at the merits stage because the decision of whether a 
court will grant a petition of certiorari is generally limited.  This section also focuses on the broader 
value of amicus participation to the parties, amici, and the Court.  Finally, this section makes the 
distinction between potential value as opposed to influence on the Court’s decisional outcomes. 
93 But, without actual citations or discussion in Court opinions, determining the actual influence 
of amici on judges can be a speculative exercise.  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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A.  Value to the Parties 
1.  Endorsement 
A common question surrounding amicus briefs is how much 
informational or strategic value they offer.  Independent of legal 
argumentation, an amicus brief may serve as a group endorsement of a 
particular party or outcome in the hope that political pressure will bolster a 
party’s case.  Within the amicus brief and a motion for leave to file an 
amicus brief, groups (regardless of whether parties grant consent) indicate 
their “size, status, and expertise” through a required “statement of 
interest.”94  This “statement of interest” allows amici to communicate 
information about the political, social, economic consequences of the 
Court's decision as well as the legitimacy of their cause.95  In such cases, 
groups may add their own prestige to the primary litigant’s case or signal 
the presence of widespread and diverse support.  For example, anecdotal 
evidence shows Supreme Court clerks give the ACLU’s amicus briefs 
more consideration on account of their perceived superiority.96  As one 
former Supreme Court clerk indicated, certain groups, such as the ACLU, 
are habitual filers and always make the “first cut” of amicus review.97  This 
perception among clerks is, in part, due to organizational reputation and 
expertise.98  
Generally, the most cited amicus briefs come from frequent filers.99  
“Repeat players” are more likely to have an impact because they develop 
expertise and have access to specialists.100  Amici are more likely to attract 
the Court’s attention if the organization or its attorneys have a strong and 
extensive record of Supreme Court advocacy.101  Endorsement by reputable 
amici arguably bolsters a party’s standing. 
2.  Supplementary Strategies 
a.  Bolstering a Party’s Weak Legal Argumentation and Resources 
Some amicus briefs serve an important function by providing legal 
guidance for the Court when the principal litigant lacks the legal talent of 
                                                                                                                
94 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 786. 
95 Id. 
96 See Lynch, supra note 13, at 49. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. (noting that “a few clerks noted an ideological preference for ACLU briefs”).  Others 
clerks commented that the ACLU has experienced litigators who tend to raise salient legal arguments.  
Id. 
99 See Susan Hedman, Friends of the Earth and Friends of the Court: Assessing the Impact of 
Interest Group Amici Curiae in Environmental Cases Decided by the Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 187, 196, 204 (1991) (discussing how this benefit is derived by “repeat players”). 
100 Id.  For example, Pacific Legal Foundation is the most active amicus filer in environmental 
cases and is at the forefront of an expanding conservative interest group movement.  Id. 
101 See id. (“[A]mici should retain counsel with a strong record of Supreme Court advocacy to 
increase their persuasive force.”). 
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the amici.102  Amicus briefs, especially those from the government, can 
“buttress” a party’s weak presentation and even forward an argument not 
pursued by the parties.103  These situations often occur when there is a stark 
contrast between the principal litigant and the amici in legal expertise and 
resources.  In this sense, amici are crucial to articulating the public interest 
“both as a means of urging justice for underprivileged factions and in order 
to rebut opposing positions.”104  For example, in Metromedia, Inc. v. San 
Diego, the City of San Diego sought to exclude billboards in certain areas 
of the City on grounds of traffic safety and aesthetics, but the billboards 
were a mix of commercial and political messages.105  Since the billboard 
owners were not in a position to argue credibly on behalf of political 
speech because they themselves did not engage in political speech, their 
attorney requested that the ACLU file an amicus brief emphasizing the 
political speech aspects of the case.106  In a close decision, the Court 
ultimately ruled the ordinance was unconstitutional because it regulated 
political speech.107  Here, the billboard owners advanced their cause by 
enlisting the resources and support of the ACLU.108 
b.  Presenting Subtle Variations or Emotive Arguments 
Even when the representation for the principal litigants is relatively 
adequate, amicus curiae may still perform an important “subsidiary 
role.”109  In this role, amici present “subtle variations of the basic 
argument, or emotive and even questionable arguments that might result in 
a successful verdict, but are too risky to be embraced by the principal 
litigant.”110  By injecting these arguments via amicus briefs, “[a] minimum 
                                                                                                                
102 See Krislov, supra note 13, at 711. 
103 James L. Cooper, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND. L.J. 675, 691 
(1990). 
104 Schachter, supra note 16, at 143. 
105 453 U.S. 490, 493–98. 
106 Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 607 (1984).  Id. at 493. 
107 Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 521. 
108 See Ennis, supra note 106, at 607.  In “Toll v. Moreno, the World Bank submitted an amicus 
brief urging the Supreme Court to rule, on Supremacy Clause grounds, that certain state statutes which 
disadvantaged alien college students were unconstitutional.”  Id. at 606 (citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 
U.S. 1 (1982)).  Ultimately, the Court ruled for the students on the basis of the Supremacy Clause 
theory that had been discussed mainly by the amici.  Id. at 606.  In Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, the Nollans—beach-front property owners—challenged the validity of a building permit 
provision that required property owners to give the public access to their land to pass from one public 
beach to another.  483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also Hedman, supra note 99, at 195.  In Nollan, the 
building industry amici worked closely with the parties asserting takings claims to coordinate the 
content of briefs and to help the parties’ attorneys with moot court sessions.  See id at 196.  
Furthermore, Justice Scalia cited twenty cases and notes the source for the list of citations as the amicus 
brief sponsored jointly by the National Association of Homebuilders and the California Building 
Industry.  Id. at 196–97.  In establishing the new legal rule, the Court noted that it was relying on legal 
authority contained exclusively in the amicus brief of an interest group.  Id at 197.  This suggests that 
interest group amici had a critical “impact” on the Nollan court’s majority and, concomitantly, the 
evolution of land use.  Id. 
109 Krislov, supra note 13, at 711. 
110 Id. 
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[of] disapprobation attaches to the official cause.”111  Simply stated, 
arguments that may anger the Justices, unorthodox legal theories, vast 
amounts of social science data, and emotive appeals are perhaps better 
suited for amici than the immediate parties.112 
B.  Value to Amici 
1.  Counteractive Lobbying 
Interest groups may submit amicus briefs, despite the ideological or 
partisan composition of the Court, to counteract other amici.  For example, 
in a situation where the composition of the Court would appear to almost 
guarantee a decision in a group’s favor, interest groups may still have an 
incentive to submit briefs to counteract the influence of opposition 
groups.113  Although most research explaining this phenomenon focuses on 
the legislative context, it is nonetheless instructive for the Supreme Court 
context in which amici must strategically consider the efforts of competing 
groups when attempting to influence three types of decision makers—those 
predisposed to favor the group’s position, those predisposed to disapprove, 
and those who are uncommitted.114  The popularity of the amicus brief as a 
lobbying tool may stem from the fact that amicus participation is a less 
expensive alternative than standard lobbying or a publicity campaign.115  
Similarly, when compared to filing a separate lawsuit, amicus participation 
may be a more effective strategy because it lacks the procedural 
complexity of a separate lawsuit and is less expensive.116  Although 
lobbying the Court may still place certain groups with fewer organizational 
resources at a disadvantage, the Court nonetheless is more democratic 
given the presence of amici.117  Moreover, a credible argument can be 
                                                                                                                
111 Id. at 711–12. 
112 See id. 
113 See generally David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 25 (1994). 
114 Commentators also acknowledge that groups have other reasons for filing briefs such as 
showing the groups importance to its own members even if there is little evidence that a brief will 
influence judicial outcomes.  See Collins, supra note 80, at 825–26.  The relatively low costs of amicus 
participation make this possible.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
115 Schachter, supra note 16, at 116. 
116 See id. at 117 (discussing the complexity of joinder and intervention in the context of class 
actions). 
117  Commentators acknowledge how amici have a democratizing influence on the Court, but also 
cite certain drawbacks: 
Increasing technological complexity and the need for information will likely make 
the U.S. Supreme Court a more democratic place, but the democracy that will 
flourish in the marble palace will be pluralistic, and organized interests with 
significant lobbying strengths in those other branches will exercise considerably 
more influence than those less well endowed.  Thus, lobbying the Court will 
continue to become more akin to lobbying the legislatures, and groups with fewer 
organizational resources will not likely overcome their political disadvantages by 
entering the judicial arena. 
SUZANNE U. SAMUELS, FIRST AMONG FRIENDS 221 (2004). 
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made that certain amici such as LDF and the ACLU do reflect the interests 
of vulnerable groups. 
2.  Highlighting Externalities or Silently Impacting Other Contexts 
Different organizations do not enter the fray of amicus participation on 
the same terms.  For example, for organizations such as the NAACP and 
the ACLU, it is their business to litigate on behalf of groups.  In other 
scenarios, the amici’s connection to the immediate parties can be indirect 
or tenuous at best.  Yet, amicus participation may bring the consequences 
of a decision on discrete interests or third parties to the attention of the 
Court.118   In this sense, amicus participation provides a vehicle for discrete 
interests, who either lack standing or are unaccomplished litigators, to 
lobby the Court and perhaps raise its awareness of third parties and the 
effect of a decision beyond its immediate context.119  Groups may also 
desire third party consequences and outcomes, but choose not to alert the 
Court.  By planting language and arguments in the instant case, groups can 
strategically advance their cause in other contexts.  For instance, a pro-life 
group may participate as an amici in a physician-assisted suicide case 
(without mention of the abortion issue) understanding that a favorable 
disposition may undermine the pro-choice position in the abortion 
context.120  Thus, the arguments made by amici may only be a pretext for a 
group’s true motivations or intended results. 
3.  Signaling Amici’s Involvement to its Own Members, Potential 
Members, and Other Organizations 
Interest groups have other motivations than to simply influence the 
Supreme Court’s output.  The existing amicus participation literature fails 
to adequately explain or entertain the secondary motivations of multiple 
stakeholders.  One study of amicus participation has determined that 
coalition amicus briefs may not play a statistically significant role in 
increasing success before the Supreme Court, and as a result, interest 
                                                                                                                
118 In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), a particular amicus brief filed by former 
prominent military personnel attracted significant attention from the Court.  See Sylvia H. Walbolt & 
Joseph H. Lang Jr., Amicus Briefs Revisited, 33 STETSON L. REV. 171, 177 (2003).  The brief did not 
simply replicate the legal arguments in each party’s brief.  Rather, this brief introduced an entirely 
unique factual perspective by articulating the “importance of race-conscious admissions and recruiting 
practices of service academies and the ROTC.”  Id. at 179.  In addition, this amicus brief was 
particularly compelling because it was presented during a period of armed conflict when the Nation’s 
attention was focused on the war in Iraq.  See id.  Here, the amici prompted the Court to consider the 
consequences of the decision “outside the narrow scope of one particular university’s admissions 
procedures.”  Id. at 180.  Similarly, in a right to die case, the AMA may not argue the law as much as 
the policy burden on doctors and medical ethics because they have no direct interest in the parties 
involved in the case.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
119 The brief submitted by the women’s groups in Washington v. Glucksberg is an example.  See 
discussion infra Part V.A. 
120 See discussion infra Part VI.A.1.b.iii. 
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groups may have other motivations.121  Interest groups are always 
interested in satisfying their current membership, attracting additional 
membership, and building relationships with similarly aligned 
organizations.  Thus, amici coalition briefs are a low-cost mechanism for 
showing a group’s members and potential members that the organization is 
actively pursuing policy goals and wielding influence in the judicial 
arena.122  In addition, coalition amici activity is a low cost method for 
group interaction and collaboration. 
C.  Value to the Court 
1.  Information Gathering 
One can argue that amicus briefs alleviate costly information gathering 
which adds to the stability of the political system.123  Governmental and 
non-governmental organizations have access to a plethora of information 
that is not readily available to the Court.124  By providing supplemental 
information, amici can preserve judicial resources whereas repetitive 
information may do the opposite.  Amicus participation provides valuable 
information in two principle ways: (i) acting as barometer for interest 
group activity and public opinion125 and (ii) providing supplemental 
substantive legal, policy, and social science arguments.126 
a.  The Barometer Function 
Amicus participation serves as a crude barometer of public opinion, 
particularly in politically-charged cases.  However, unlike public opinion 
surveys and other fora where interest groups participate, amicus briefs are 
more focused on case related issues and the audience is more clearly 
defined via the statement of interest.127  Justices can acquire information 
about societal demand and significance by observing the extent of amicus 
                                                                                                                
121 See Collins, supra note 80, at 825–26. 
122 See id. 
123 See Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 19, at 1123. 
124 See Collins, supra note 80, at 808–13 (asserting the so-called information hypothesis that 
amicus briefs are effective because of the additional information they provide litigants and offering 
anecdotal evidence that Justices pay attention to interest groups ‘supporting briefs’). 
125 See id. at 814. (“Thus, the affected groups hypothesis holds that it is not the social scientific, 
legal, or political arguments briefs contain that influence the court, but instead the mere presence of a 
large number of interest on one side of the dispute relative to another.”). 
126 See id. at 814–15.  Information theory maintains that the value of amicus briefs is not merely 
as a proxy for interest group activity, but the actual arguments legal and otherwise contained in the 
briefs.  See Amici Curiae Briefs: The Court’s Perspective 181–83 (dividing informational value into 
three categories: (i) supplemental or new information; (ii) implications of decisions; and (iii) 
identifying important cases). 
127 A study of amici participation at the certiorari stage asserted that the informational value of 
briefs lies in their presence or absence and not necessarily in their substantive arguments advanced.  
See Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 19, at 1113.  Contrary to what many 
organizations may think, studies indicate opposition briefs at the certiorari stage significantly increase 
the likelihood that certiorari will be granted.  Instead of decreasing the court’s interest, opposition 
briefs may pique it. 
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participation.128  However, the exact degree of responsiveness the Justices 
exhibit when selecting their dockets or rendering a decision remains 
uncertain.129 
b.  Substantive Information 
Beyond signaling interest group or public support, amici also provide 
valuable information in the form of substantive legal, policy and social 
science arguments.  Amicus brief submission is the most widely used 
method for submitting social science data as non-record evidence.130  
However, some commentators argue that the politicization of amicus briefs 
is alarming because Justices do not have an adequate mechanism for 
independently assessing the claims, the research, and the evidence 
submitted.131  From this perspective, the Justices are vulnerable to being 
“misled” by politically distorted social science data.132  Notwithstanding 
these criticisms, amici continue to lend support to the Court in this 
manner.133 
Scholars further speculate that information presented to the Court via 
amici will become increasingly influential.  For example, cases involving 
highly technical issues, such as new reproductive technologies that have 
only been heard in lower federal and state courts, will eventually reach the 
Court.134  While seeking to understand these complex issues, the Justices 
will rely on information provided by medical, scientific, and legal experts 
about the nature of these technologies and the role of social norms and 
traditions in determining issues like parental status.135  Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that amicus briefs addressing specialized areas of law (e.g., tax, 
bankruptcy) provide valuable guidance to the Court whereas briefs 
reiterating constitutional arguments made by the parties are of lesser 
value.136 
                                                                                                                
128 See Lucius T. Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Systemic View of the Judicial Function, 29 
J. POL. 41, 56 (1967) (“The amicus brief, in a sense, also allows the Court to weigh ‘political’ 
information in a judicial way.”). 
129 See Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You’ve Got to Have Friends: Lessons Learned From 
the Role of Amici in the University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503, 528 (2004) (“Amicus briefs 
can also be helpful if central, unifying themes emerge from the cacophony of voices in front of the 
court.  In this respect, amicus briefs that focus solely on external organizations’ own agendas are not as 
helpful as briefs that highlight the broader societal impact . . . .”). 
130 See id. 
131 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 93–94. 
132 Id. at 94. 
133 For example, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court discussed the treatment of juvenile death 
penalty in other nations and revealed that “all information regarding foreign death penalty laws is 
drawn from [the Appendix to the] Brief for Amnesty International as Amicus Curiae . . . and from 
Death Penalty in Various Countries, prepared by members of the staff of the Law Library of the 
Library of Congress.”  Luther T. Munford, When Does the Curiae Need an Amicus?, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 279, 281 n.12 (1999). 
134 See SAMUELS, supra note 117, at 219. 
135 See id.; see also Lynch, supra note 13, at 41 (describing how clerks found amicus briefs 
addressing technical issues among the most useful). 
136 See Lynch, supra note 13, at 41–42 (stating that “there exists a positive correlation between 
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Unlike other forms of evidence that have been presented and 
challenged throughout the litigation process, evidence contained in amicus 
briefs is not subject to cross-examination or expert testimony from either 
side.137  Amicus briefs lack the safeguards characteristic of other forms of 
evidence.  Parties, however, do receive the briefs and have the opportunity 
to respond or rebut information, facts, and arguments contained in the 
briefs.  Nonetheless, such a task may be unduly burdensome and drain 
resources.  Furthermore, amici, unlike the parties, do not have to work 
from a trial record or preserve issues for appeal.  These concerns, however, 
are mitigated via (i) disclosure requirements under Supreme Court Rules to 
identify potential bias; (ii) the conservation of judicial resources via 
information gathering; and (iii) the skill of the Justices and their clerks.138  
In the absence of rules restricting access, the Court has developed its own 
filtering mechanisms for analyzing amicus briefs139 and, upon occasion, 
provided informal guidance to potential filers concerning the Court’s (or 
Justices’) preferences.140  Ultimately, the usefulness of findings and 
arguments presented in amicus briefs hinges on their adequate 
evaluation.141 
2.  Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is rarely mentioned in the legal literature addressing 
amicus participation, but its importance cannot be ignored.  The normative 
basis for broad amicus participation as currently practiced in not simply 
informational value.  The Court’s institutional legitimacy depends on both 
norms of inclusion and independence.  Amicus participation contributes to 
the former.142 
V.  WHO PARTICIPATES AS AMICI 
This section focuses on the dynamics of amicus participation—who, 
when, and why amici participate.  The Supreme Court is accessible to a 
wide array of interests via amicus participation.  This broad participation 
reinforces democratic norms of inclusion.  Often entities become amici 
because they lack direct litigant status, they fail to meet the standard for 
intervention,143 or simply because of the advantages that amicus status 
brings (i.e., flexibility and cost).  Some organizations may not have the 
                                                                                                                
legal obscurity of [the] subject matter and the helpfulness of amicus participation”). 
137 See id. 
138 Schacter, supra note 16, at 136, 143–44. 
139 Anecdotal evidence suggests that Supreme Court clerks play a filtering role for amicus filings.  
See Lynch, supra note 13, at 43–46.  A number of factors may determine the degree of review a brief 
receives include, but are not limited to: the reputation of the filer, the substantive nature of the case, and 
Court workload. 
140 See Mauro, supra note 56 (discussing comments of Justices concerning amicus briefs). 
141 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 99. 
142 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
143 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
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resources to achieve their goals through litigation or an organization may 
not find a suitable plaintiff to represent at the trial stage.  For such groups, 
amicus participation can provide a rare opportunity to affect policy at the 
top.  In 1982 alone, the Supreme Court had over 3000 amici representing 
over 1400 distinct organizations.144  Generally, amici fall into two broad 
categories—non-governmental and governmental entities.145 
A.  Non-Governmental Entities 
The broad category of non-governmental entities includes a myriad of 
subcategories: individuals; charitable and community organizations; public 
interest law firms and policy research groups; citizen and public interest 
advocacy groups; business, trade, and professional organizations; and 
unions.146  These organizations are very diverse in their membership, 
ideology, resources, focus, and flexibility.  For example, the principal 
function of public interest advocacy organizations such as the LDF, 
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (“LCCRUL”), and ACLU 
is litigation.  Meanwhile, for community organizations such as the Boy 
Scouts, professional organizations such as the American Medical 
Association (“AMA”), and unions like the AFL-CIO, litigation does not 
constitute the bulk of their activities, but when it does, it usually takes the 
form of amicus participation.147  Even within organizational categories 
there is significant differentiation.  Whereas LDF confines itself to issues 
related to racial and ethnic discrimination, the ACLU litigates a broader 
range of issues.  It is important to note that organizations may have a direct 
or indirect interest in a case’s outcome.  An organization may support a 
party only because an unfavorable decision in the instant case may have 
consequences in other contexts.  For instance, a pro-life interest group may 
weigh in on an issue such as physician-assisted suicide only because of the 
potential implications in the abortion context.148 
B.  Governmental Entities 
Governmental entities participate more than other groups of amici.  
These entities include state, county, district, municipal, and the federal 
government (e.g., the Solicitor General).149  In fact, individual states alone 
participate more than other groups at both stages of amicus participation.150  
                                                                                                                
144 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 789. 
145 Supreme Court Rule 37 makes a similar distinction by imposing greater filing requirements on 
non-governmental entities.  SUP. CT. R. 37. 
146 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 791 (providing a table classifying amici by type of 
organization). 
147 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 807–08. 
148 See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
149 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 791. 
150 Id. at 793–94.  States account for approximately over one-third of amicus participation at the 
agenda setting stage and a quarter of amici at the plenary stage.  Id. 
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According to one study, state amici filed briefs in 14.5% of cases from 
1946 to 1995.151  As previously mentioned, Supreme Court Rules impose 
fewer filing restrictions on governmental entities favoring the participation 
of governmental amici.  Widespread state participation is also related to the 
wide reach of Court decisions.  Whenever the Supreme Court addresses the 
constitutionality of a statute with statewide application, the Supreme Court 
considers the view taken by a state or its agents as “highly relevant.”152  
For example, when a state’s assisted suicide law is under constitutional 
scrutiny, not just that state will participate, but every other state with a 
similar law will also attempt to influence the Court’s decision.153  The high 
degree of state participation is evidence of intergovernmental lobbying of 
the Supreme Court.154 
The most influential governmental entity, however, is the Office of the 
Solicitor General.155  The Solicitor General, the Government’s chief 
litigator before the Supreme Court, is appointed by the President.156  The 
United States (or the Solicitor General) is the most successful as well as 
the most frequent amici before the Court.157  The Solicitor General has 
                                                                                                                
151 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 753 n.25. 
152 See New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 245, 248 n.1 (1984) (acknowledging that the position 
taken by a state attorney in an amicus brief provided additional support for the conclusion that a grant 
of certiorari was improvident). 
153 See discussion infra Part VI.A.; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–30 
(1997) (analyzing whether assisted suicide violates the Fourteenth Amendment). 
154 See discussion infra Part VI. 
155 According to the Kearney study, the Solicitor General filed briefs in sixteen percent of cases 
(991 cases) from 1946–95.  Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 753 n.25.  Moreover, the Solicitor 
General’s amicus briefs are cited most frequently by the Court.  In fact, the Court cited the Solicitor 
General as amici in “[forty percent] of cases in which the Solicitor General filed a brief” between 1946 
and 1995 (402 cases).  Id. at 760. 
156 The functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are as follows: 
The task of the Office of the Solicitor General is to supervise and conduct 
government litigation in the United States Supreme Court.  Virtually all such 
litigation is channeled through the Office of the Solicitor General and is actively 
conducted by the Office.  The United States is involved in approximately two-thirds 
of all the cases the U.S. Supreme Court decides on the merits each year. 
The Solicitor General determines the cases in which Supreme Court review will 
be sought by the government and the positions the government will take before the 
Court.  The Office’s staff attorneys, Deputy Solicitors General and Assistants to the 
Solicitor General, participate in preparing the petitions, briefs, and other papers filed 
by the government in the Supreme Court.  The Solicitor General conducts the oral 
arguments before the Supreme Court.  Those cases not argued by the Solicitor 
General personally are assigned either to an Assistant to the Solicitor General or to 
another government attorney.  The vast majority of government cases are argued by 
the Solicitor General or one of the office attorneys. 
Another responsibility of the Office is to review all cases decided adversely to 
the government in the lower courts to determine whether they should be appealed 
and, if so, what position should be taken.  Moreover, the Solicitor General 
determines whether the government will participate as an amicus curiae, or 
intervene, in cases in any appellate court. 
Office of the Solicitor General, About the Office of the Soliciter General, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/about_us.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (discussing the functions of the 
Office of the Solicitor General). 
157 See Karen O’Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court 
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monopolistic authority to choose whether the government will litigate, how 
the government will litigate, and how legal resources will be allocated.  
The Solicitor General’s decision to allocate resources toward arguing as 
amicus curiae in lieu of litigating cases where the agencies are directly 
involved potentially “exacerbates the risks of political partisanship . . . .”158  
The decision to file an amicus brief is largely a discretionary exercise.  The 
Solicitor General can submit an amicus brief any time a federal interest can 
be shown in a case.159  Supreme Court Rule 37.4 does not require the 
Solicitor General to acquire consent from either of the parties.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court “often invites the Solicitor General to file 
an amicus brief in order to ascertain the opinion and otherwise unavailable 
information” from the federal government or the executive branch.160  
Approximately one-third of the United States’ participation as amicus 
curiae is the result of Court invitation.161 
Amicus participation may present an opportunity for the Solicitor 
General’s Office to interject the partisan ideology of the executive branch 
at the expense of the individual agencies.162  The Solicitor General’s 
ambiguous and unique role leads critics to question his ultimate allegiance 
because the office embodies an agency problem that only worsens when 
filing amicus briefs.163  The most evident connection the Solicitor General 
has is to the President who appoints him.  The President may exert both 
direct and indirect influences on the Solicitor General’s activities.  The 
need for monitoring by the President is mitigated by the fact that the 
President usually appoints individuals who share the President’s views.164  
                                                                                                                
Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256, 261 (1983) (“[T]he solicitor general’s success rate as amicus curiae 
surpasses the high win-loss ratio that the government enjoys as a party to a suit.”); see also Todd 
Lochner, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the Independent Agencies: A 
Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REV. 549, 561 (1993) (“By far[,] the most frequent amici before the Court, the 
United States, is also one of the most successful.”); Lynch, supra note 13, at 46 (“Approximately 70% 
of the seventy clerks interviewed emphatically cited the solicitor general as the most important filer.”). 
158 Lochner, supra note 157, at 551. 
159 See Lynch, supra note 13, at 47 (“[T]he government need not seek the permission of the 
litigants in order to file an amicus brief.”). 
160 Lochner, supra note 157, at 561. 
161 Id. 
162 A counter-argument to this claim is that the President appoints the various agency heads and 
this lessens the need for partisan excess by the Solicitor General. 
163 The government has wide discretion to enter any case and take any substantive position.  See 
Cooper, supra note 103, at 680, 685 (“[W]here the government acts sua sponte it does not confront the 
barriers that other parties do.”).  The Solicitor General may file amicus briefs that differ from the 
positions taken by the various agencies. 
164 See id. at 681.  For example, when President Lyndon B. Johnson offered the Solicitor 
Generalship to Thurgood Marshall, “he complimented Marshall’s ability as a lawyer and said he 
needed an outstanding legal mind to represent him before the Supreme Court.”  JUAN WILLIAMS, 
THURGOOD MARSHALL: AN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 314–15 (1998) (emphasis added).  Johnson 
also was very clear about making no explicit future promises about a Supreme Court appointment:  “I 
want that distinctly understood—there’s no quid pro quo here at all.  You do your job.  If you don’t do 
it, you go out.  If you do it, you stay here.  And that’s all there is to it.”  Id.  Moreover, when Johnson 
heard of Marshall’s plans to commute from New York, he articulated his disapproval.  See id. at 318.  
Almost three weeks later Marshall sent the President a note expressing his plans to move his family to 
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Furthermore, “in many amicus appearances, the issues are rather apolitical 
and unlikely to be of special interest to the President.”165 
The federal government’s submission of amicus briefs has increased 
over time.166  Between 1966 and 1977 amicus briefs constituted only 
twenty percent of the federal government’s participation before the 
Supreme Court.167  Today, as much as forty-five percent of the Solicitor 
General’s argumentation is through amicus submission.168  Surprisingly, 
the United States has a higher success rate when it participates as amici as 
opposed to participating as a party.  According to some studies, the United 
States’ view prevails in approximately seventy-five percent of the cases in 
which it participates as amici.169  An amicus brief from the Solicitor 
General’s office is a political barometer from which the Court can 
ascertain the likely executive reaction.170  In Brown, the Solicitor General’s 
amicus brief provided the Court with the needed assurance that the chief 
executive supported an order ruling against segregation.171 
The Solicitor General may have other important goals for filing amicus 
briefs besides espousing executive ideology that may include providing the 
Court with unavailable information,172 presenting her own views on 
important government issues,173 protecting the government who may be a 
party in interest, articulating a singular government voice,174 and providing 
a flexible strategy for dealing with agencies.175  Other factors supporting 
the Solicitor General’s broad discretionary power include the fact that the 
Solicitor General’s staff are regarded as among the best attorneys in the 
country and that the Solicitor General plays a crucial role by decreasing the 
                                                                                                                
Washington, D.C.  See id.  In August of 1965, Thurgood Marshall became the 33rd Solicitor General in 
U.S. history.  Although the above is an anecdotal reference, it nonetheless suggests the influence and 
allegiance between the President and the Solicitor General as well as the tenuous connection between 
the Solicitor General and the administrative agencies. 
165 Cooper, supra note 103, at 681. 
166 The Solicitor General’s use of the amicus brief began in 1909; however, amicus participation 
remained infrequent until the 1950s.  See Lochner, supra note 157, at 561. 
167 Id. at 561. 
168 Id. 
169 Id.  However, the success rate varies with the particular Solicitor General. 
170 Id. at 562. 
171 Id.; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).  But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding a University of Michigan admissions policy despite government opposition 
as amici). 
172 The Government’s resources are vast.  They include unpublished studies from various agencies 
as well as congressional transcripts.  
173 Elana Kagan became the first woman to serve as Solicitor General of the United States in 
2009.  See Office of the Solicitor General, supra note 156. 
174 Commentators argue that the Solicitor General must take a broader view than the parochial 
view of an individual agency; and even if a narrow viewpoint is required, the Solicitor General, in all 
likelihood is in the best position to do it.  See Lochner, supra note 157, at 570. 
175 Id. at 562.  For example, in Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court requested an 
amicus brief from the Solicitor General “when the government and the taxpayer took the same view of 
the legislation at issue.”  Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, With Friends Like These . . . , 70 
A.B.A. J. 16, 20 (1984) (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
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Court’s workload.176  The latter “gatekeeper” function is perhaps the most 
important.177  The Solicitor General’s influence is indisputable in both 
agenda setting and asserting the Government’s position at the merits phase 
of Supreme Court litigation. 
C.  When Groups Enter as Amici 
At the Supreme Court, there is a fairly constant “mix of interest 
representation across institutional contexts.”178  Approximately thirty 
percent of all amicus activity occurs at the certiorari or agenda setting 
stage.179  In general, governmental entities and business groups are more 
active than other organizations at the agenda setting stage.  As a result, one 
would expect governmental entities and business groups to play a larger 
role in setting the Court’s agenda.180  Some argue that this discrepancy may 
be due in part to informational advantages.181  Public choice accounts of 
interest group participation also support this result.182  The majority of 
amicus participation, however, takes place at the merits phase where the 
discrepancies between governmental entities and non-governmental 
participation become less pronounced.183  Most organizations participate at 
the merits phase rather than the agenda setting stage, due in part to cost 
effectiveness, but also due to the fact that cases become more visible once 
the Court grants certiorari.184  Accordingly, citizen groups and public 
interest law firms allocate most of their resources toward the merits phase.  
Once cases appear on the Court’s docket, organizations can prepare more 
effectively, and the stakes rise as well.185   At the later merits stage, amicus 
participation becomes more pluralistic symbolizing democratic 
inclusion.186 
The different strategies governmental entities and non-governmental 
entities use to determine when and how to participate as amici may be a 
                                                                                                                
176 Lochner, supra note 157, at 570.  The resumes of recent Solicitor General’s such as Seth 
Waxman, Walter Dellinger, and Ted Olsen add to the prestige and perception of the office. 
177 Cooper, supra note 103, at 682 (1990) (noting that the Court has acknowledged the importance 
of this function both publicly and privately). 
178 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 797. 
179 Id. at 803.  See also SUP. CT. R. 10. (outlining the procedure for reviewing requests for 
certiorari, as well as the writ approval process). 
180 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 797. 
181 See id. at 793 (noting the existence of institutionalized forms of communication among 
government units). 
182 See Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
1040, 1044 (John Eatwell et. al. eds., 1987). 
183 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 801. 
184 See id. at 792. 
185 See id. at 792–93. 
186 The character of the information and the nature of the influence may shift depending on the 
particular stage of litigation.  See David Austen-Smith, Information and Influence: Lobbying for 
Agendas and Votes, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 800, 825 (1993) (concluding that lobbying Congress is more 
effective at agenda setting stage). 
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function of organizational concerns such as cost effectiveness,187 
constituencies, and information asymmetries.188  Instead of pooling 
resources and filing coalition briefs, the general pattern is for groups, both 
governmental and non-governmental, to file multiple separate briefs, which 
are more costly.189  But more coalition activity occurs with governmental 
entities, especially among states.190  This may suggest some form of 
signaling that groups value.  Coalition briefs give the appearance of 
widespread, diverse, and prestigious support.  Although the degree of 
influence that groups exert over the Court is uncertain, the continued 
presence of heightened group activity, at a minimum, signals that amici 
value their own participation.  In this sense, the Court’s institutional 
legitimacy is reinforced through the symbolic reassurance and discursive 
process of amicus participation. 
VI.  THE EXAMPLES OF WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG                                   
AND ROPER V. SIMMONS 
Amicus participation plays a symbolic role and the Court operates 
most like a quasi-representative body in cases involving contentious social 
and political issues such as abortion, free speech, affirmative action, and 
physician-assisted suicide.  The types of issues involved in a case may 
influence the Court’s receptiveness to amici.191  For instance, topics such 
as physician-assisted suicide and capital punishment have broad social 
consequences that stretch across individual, organizational, jurisdictional, 
and moral boundaries.192  Under such circumstances, Justices cannot 
confine themselves to the immediate parties or disputeotherwise they 
risk damaging the Court’s institutional legitimacy.  In other contexts, 
                                                                                                                
187 The cost of filing an amicus brief can range between $15,000 and $60,000.  See Caldeira & 
Wright, supra note 13, at 800; see also Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 19, at 1112.  
Hence, the cost is not trivial. 
188 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 794, 798. 
189 See id. at 804. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the Justices would prefer that 
parties file coalition briefs when possible to limit the burden on the court.  See Mauro, supra note 56 
(quoting Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concerning participation by amici). 
190 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 798–99. 
191 There is anecdotal evidence that the Court values external input in certain cases as opposed to 
others.  See Lynch, supra note 13, at 41–42 (“The majority of clerks (56%) explained that amicus briefs 
were most helpful in cases involving highly technical and specialized areas of law, as well as complex 
statutory and regulatory cases.”).  Amici may be more influential in cases addressing technical and 
scientific issues beyond the Court’s expertise.  See Stephanie Tai, Friendly Science: Medical, Scientific, 
and Technical Amici Before the Supreme Court, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 789, 794–97 (2000) (“The unique 
perspectives, facts, and arguments of scientific disciplines can inform that Court of the broader legal 
and policy implications of its rulings.”); see also Mauro, supra note 56.  However, this is difficult to 
empirically validate.  Nonetheless, interest groups seize the opportunity to influence or sway outcomes. 
192 Although cases involving business and market regulation do not attract nearly the same level 
of public attention as abortion or affirmative action, they are undoubtedly just as vital.  See Ronald A. 
Cass & Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court’s Business, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2005, at A14.  The 
effect of poor decisions in these cases could have a crippling economic impact on American businesses 
and markets. 
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where the issues lack political salience and amicus participation is 
minimal, the risk is attenuated. 
The level of amicus participation, the diversity of amici, and the actual 
content of the arguments raised by the amici in Washington v. Glucksberg 
(an assisted suicide case) and Roper v. Simmons (a death penalty case) are 
instructive for the overall discussion of political symbolism and the 
Supreme Court’s quasi-representative function.  Ultimately, these 
examples illustrate that the Court “encourages the aggregation and 
articulation of interests” and shares some similarities with other 
representative institutions.193  Yet, the Court’s representative function is 
more symbolic.  This, however, does not present a problem.  In fact, this 
may be a source of comfort because the Court’s institutional legitimacy is 
also tied to its stability and independence.  The Court’s representative 
capacity must be balanced with its independence.  Ultimately, the Court’s 
judgment rests with nine Justices who are not threatened with removal. 
In addition to robust participation by diverse amici, the content of the 
arguments raised by amici illustrates how amicus participation provides a 
deliberative and discursive forum.194  The perspectives of amici may 
enhance the prospect of better substantive decisions and the mere 
opportunity to participate in the lawmaking process enhances the Court’s 
legitimacy even where a party disagrees with the ultimate outcome.195  
Discursive debate and participation is particularly important for groups 
normally excluded from the legislative process.  In general, amici in 
Glucksberg and Roper made one or a combination of six types of 
argumentation: (i) legal arguments; (ii) ethical arguments raising moral and 
ethical concerns in support of a particular decision; (iii) emotive arguments 
using graphic imagery and language intended to evoke an emotional 
response; (iv) externality arguments intended to inform the Court about the 
consequences of a decision beyond the immediate context and its effect on 
third parties; (v) signaling arguments showing the Court the size, prestige, 
and expertise of the amici; and (vi) policy arguments employing empirical 
evidence, policy analysis, and social science evidence.  The following 
subsections provide examples of the diverse amici and the content of the 
arguments they pursued in Glucksberg and Roper. 
A.  Washington v. Gluckberg 
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether a state statute criminalizing assisted suicide violated 
the Due Process Clause insofar as it prohibited physicians from 
administering lethal doses of medication to competent terminally ill 
                                                                                                                
193 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 803.  As previously mentioned, the exact degree of 
influence remains uncertain. 
194 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 68, at 42. 
195 Id. 
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patients upon their request.196  The Court held in favor of the State of 
Washington (the petitioner), concluding that (i) the asserted right to 
assistance in committing suicide was not a fundamental right protected by 
the Due Process Clause and (ii) Washington’s ban on physician-assisted 
suicide was rationally related to legitimate government interests.197  In 
total, there were over fifty amicus briefs submitted at the merits stage.  
These briefs represented a diverse range of parties from the Solicitor 
General to women’s rights groups to an individual John Doe afflicted with 
a terminal illness.  These briefs were submitted in support of petitioner 
(i.e., the State of Washington), in support of respondents (i.e., terminally ill 
patients, physicians, and nonprofits), and for the purpose of neutral 
advocacy.  Although there was a considerable degree of repetitive 
argumentation among the different amici who supported the same party, 
the amici differed in their reasons for support and in the types of 
argumentation they pursued. 
1.  Amici Supporting Petitioners 
a.  Governmental Amici 
In Washington v. Glucksberg, approximately two-thirds of the amicus 
briefs at the merits stage were in support of petitioners.  This support came 
from a significant number of governmental entities.  For example, the 
Solicitor General asserted that the physician-assisted suicide issue is of 
governmental interest because the “United States owns and operates 
numerous health care facilities which permit patients to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, but do not permit physicians to assist patients in 
committing suicide by providing lethal dosages of medication.”198  The 
Solicitor General argued that although there was a liberty interest (though 
not fundamental) at stake, “[o]verriding state interests justify the State’s 
decision to ban physicians from prescribing lethal medication.”199  
Moreover, the Solicitor General noted that state legislatures “undoubtedly 
have the authority” to create exceptions to a ban on assisted suicide, “[b]ut 
                                                                                                                
196 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997).  The suit originated in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Washington where four physicians, three terminally ill 
patients, and a nonprofit organization challenged the statute and prevailed at summary judgment.  See 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1455–56 (W.D. Wash. 1994).  Subsequently, 
the State of Washington appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit where the decision 
was reversed.  See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1995).  On 
rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision.  Thereafter, the State 
of Washington petitioned for writ of certiorari.  The Second Circuit case, Quill v. Vaco, 80 F.3d 716 
(2d Cir. 1996), was merged with Washington v. Glucksberg at the Supreme Court.  Ultimately, the 
Court’s decision was unanimous. 
197 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
198 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663185.  The brief also noted that the 
Department of Veteran affairs operated “173 medical centers, 126 nursing homes, and 55 in-patient 
hospices.”  Id. at 2. 
199 Id. at 8–9. 
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there is no constitutional basis for imposing that exception on all States.”200  
The Solicitor General was not the only party from the federal government 
to submit an amicus brief in this case.  Senator Orrin Hatch, Representative 
Henry Hyde, and Representative Charles Canady submitted a brief arguing 
for a restraint on judicial review and cautioned against the Court usurping 
the judgments of state legislatures and courts.201 
Not surprisingly, many states with similar statutes at risk of being 
invalidated submitted briefs.  Instead of submitting separate briefs, many 
states submitted coalition briefs.  In general, state amici asserted legal 
arguments that placed extreme emphasis on federalism concerns and 
“[r]espect for state sovereignty and the power of the people to directly 
govern their own affairs, unless excluded by the Constitution or valid act 
of Congress.”202  The states also noted that a majority of states (forty-seven 
out of fifty) make the distinction between refusing unwanted life sustaining 
treatment and the act of suicide in their natural death/living will statutes.203  
Here, the states’ coalition brief signaled to the Court the presence of a 
majority consensus. 
The State of Oregon submitted a separate individual brief.204  Although 
Oregon had altered its laws to permit physician-assisted suicide for the 
terminally ill, it supported petitioners nonetheless.  Oregon asserted that 
the minority of states that permit physician-assisted suicide (or those that 
are considering it) also have an interest in the outcome of the case because 
if terminally ill adults have a fundamental liberty interest in physician-
assisted suicide, “state supervision and regulation in this area will be 
subject to exacting judicial review.”205  Although a decision for 
respondents would not invalidate Oregon’s assisted suicide law, it would 
undermine state legislative discretion overall.  Oregon’s brief contended 
that the approaches of both Washington and Oregon were constitutionally 
                                                                                                                
200 Id. at 9–10. 
201 See Brief of Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairmen of Senate Judiciary Committee et. al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 
1996 WL 657755 (“The purpose of this brief is to show that a principled middle ground exists, in 
which the courts may recognize and enforce constitutional rights in a fashion that gives due respect to 
the coordinate branches of government and the traditions of the people.”). 
202 Brief of Amici Curiae States of California, Alabama, Colorado et. al. in Support of Petitioners 
State of Washington at 1–3, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 
33413986.  The states explained: 
Whether that balance should be abandoned and the line redrawn to permit an 
individual to commit suicide without state interference, and then redrawn yet again 
to permit assisted suicide, is a matter appropriately left for the people to decide, 
through their duly elected representatives or by initiative ballot.  The principles of 
federalism embodied in our Constitution require no less. 
Id. at 19. 
203 See id. (“[S]tatutes in a majority of states . . . codify an individual’s right to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment and, in the same legislation, reject any affirmative act to end life.”). 
204 Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Oregon in Support of Petitioners State of Washington et al., 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663194. 
205 Id. at 1–3. 
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permissible.  Although the states’ briefs articulated similar arguments, 
Oregon’s brief, coming from a minority jurisdiction’s perspective, 
performed a complementary function. 
Another interesting government brief came from prosecuting attorneys 
in Oakland County, Michigan where the famous Jack Kevorkian had 
performed more than forty-five physician-assisted suicides.206  The 
prosecutors acknowledged that “[b]oth petitioners and amici can inform 
the Court of the certainty that recognition of a new constitutional right will 
inevitably start our society on a trip down [a] ‘slippery slope’ . . . .”207  The 
prosecutors wanted to avoid the submission of a “me-too” brief, and 
accordingly the prosecutors described themselves as the only amicus who 
could inform the Court about “actual practical experience with the reality 
of assisted suicide” having attempted to prosecute Jack Kevorkian, the 
“‘poster child’ of the assisted suicide movement.”208  The prosecutors 
cautioned that physician-assisted suicide was incapable of being confined 
or controlled by specific regulations and that “[o]nly by refusing to 
recognize a new constitutional right to die can this Court hope to prevent 
the incursion of more ‘Dr. Deaths’ who will offer the sick, infirm, 
depressed, and aged only the siren song of a painless death.”209  This brief 
utilized signaling, emotive, and policy arguments. 
b.  Non-Governmental Amici 
i.  Religious Organizations 
Petitioners also received significant support from non-governmental 
entities.  The United States Catholic Conference210 along with many other 
religious organizations submitted a coalition brief that included less 
argument of religious ethics than repetition of the legal arguments made by 
other amici.  Besides repetition, this brief also signaled the breadth and 
diversity of religious organizations supporting petitioner’s arguments. 
ii.  Medical Health Organizations 
Certain members of the health community supported petitioners’ 
position.  The AMA’s amicus brief took an ethical approach arguing that 
“[t]he power to assist in intentionally taking the life of a patient is 
antithetical to the central mission of healing that guides both medicine and 
                                                                                                                
206 See Brief of for Richard Thompson, Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 
656291. 
207 Id. at 4. 
208 Id. at 4–5. 
209 Id. at 7. 
210 Brief for the United States Catholic Conference et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650919.  The Conference’s 
members are active Roman Catholic Bishops in the United States.  Id. at 2.  The statement of interest 
also asserts that “Roman Catholicism is the largest religious denomination in the United States, with 
over 60 million members in this country.”  Id. 
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nursing.”211  Other professional health groups signed on to the brief as 
well.  Moreover, the brief cautioned that declaring a fundamental right to 
physician-assisted suicide may slow efforts to improve the provision of 
pain relief and “compassionate end-of-life care.”212  The AMA’s brief did 
not simply repeat legal arguments.  Instead, the brief made use of ethical, 
signaling, and externality arguments in an effort to broaden the Court’s 
perspective on the issue. 
iii.  Conservative Right to Life Groups 
A number of briefs supporting petitioner came from conservative right 
to life groups who anticipated the impact this case would have in the 
abortion and other legal contexts.  At the appellate level, the right to life 
agenda had suffered a setback when the court relied heavily on the broad 
construction of liberty defined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.213  
Consequently, these groups attempted to shift the balance, using this case 
as their platform.  The Family Research Council submitted a brief that 
focused exclusively on the history of abuse surrounding euthanasia.214  The 
brief cited the Holocaust as history’s most tragic and relevant experience 
with physician-assisted suicide en route to supporting a blanket ban on 
physician-assisted suicide.215  The brief made no mention of the abortion 
issue, but instead attempted to quietly affect other contexts through 
emotive appeals.  Other right to life organizations took a more direct 
approach.  For instance, the American Center for Law and Justice216 and 
the New Hope Life Center, argued against adopting Casey’s “existentialist 
notion of liberty” that would lead “to claims of [the] right to use drugs, and 
to engage in polygamy, fornication, adultery, divorce, sodomy, bestiality, 
and consensual sadism.”217  Similarly, the Rutherford Institute218 and the 
National Right to Life Committee219 submitted briefs arguing against the 
                                                                                                                
211 Brief for the American Medical Association et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656263. 
212 Id. at 18. 
213 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”). 
214 See Brief for Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656275.  The Family Research Council’s mission is 
the “preservation and defense of traditional values and the family.”  Id. 
215 Id. at 2–4. 
216 The American Center for Law and Justice is “devoted to safeguarding the sanctity of human 
life through education, litigation, legislative assistance, and related activities . . . .”  Brief for the 
American Center for Law & Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656340. 
217 Id. at 3–4. 
218 See generally Brief for the Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 752715. 
219 See Brief for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656315 (offering numerous rationales 
grounded in precedent and policy in support of the right to life position). 
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constitutionality of assisted suicide using different legal arguments.  
Beyond the pretextual issue of assisted suicide, right to life groups sought 
to plant language and arguments that would bolster right to life advocates’ 
position in the abortion context. 
2.  Amici Supporting Respondents 
No governmental entities submitted briefs in favor of respondents; 
however, respondent support came from a number of sources.  
a.  Brief on Behalf of an Individual 
A California resident afflicted with the late stages of the AIDS virus 
submitted a supporting brief.220  The amicus, John Doe, had obtained a 
judgment in the District Court for the Central District of California that 
found a similar statute criminalizing assisted suicide invalid.221  Within 
John Doe’s statement of interest, he described in vivid detail the symptoms 
and effects of his illness asserting that AIDS patients are “emaciated 
beyond belief, reminiscent of starving individuals in Ethiopia or the dead 
photographed concentration camp victims from World War II.”222  John 
Doe argued that a statute imposing an absolute prohibition on physician-
assisted suicide intruded into the realm of private decision making 
“protected by the guarantee of liberty.”223  This brief provides yet another 
example of emotive and legal argumentation. 
b.  Legal Organizations 
The ACLU, joining many other organizations, submitted a brief in 
support of respondents.224  Unlike other amici, the ACLU’s basic 
organizational function is to litigate.  The ACLU lacks a discretely defined 
constituency, but has, according to its statement of interest, over “300,000 
members” nationwide.225  In general, the ACLU’s brief used legal 
argumentation.  The thrust of the ACLU’s argument (as with other amici 
supporting respondents) was that a state’s categorical ban on physician-
assisted suicide as applied to competent terminally ill patients was 
unconstitutional.226 
                                                                                                                
220 See Brief for John Doe as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(No. 96-110), 1996 WL 743345. 
221 Id. at 1–2. 
222 Id. at 3–4. 
223 Id. at 20. 
224 Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711194. 
225 Id. at app. 1a. 
226 See id. at 1–2 (“[A] state denies equal protection of its laws when it provides that one class of 
persons may exercise th[e] [right to die] while others who are similarly situated for all relevant 
purposes are wholly denied the opportunity to exercise the same right for the same reason.”). 
 222 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:185 
c.  Reproductive Rights and Women’s Groups 
Reproductive and women’s rights groups supported respondents 
because they identified parallels between physician-assisted suicide and 
abortion legislation.  The appellate court decision supported the 
reproductive and women’s rights agenda because the decision relied 
heavily on a broad construction of liberty asserted in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, an abortion case.  The National Women’s Health Network and 
the Northwest Women’s Law Center together submitted a brief in support 
of respondents227 that argued “[i]f the States’ position were accepted, an 
individual’s ability to make certain highly intimate and personal choices—
whether those choices are about procreation, abortion, or death—could be 
denied through a blanket ban . . . .”228  The Center for Reproductive Law 
and Policy urged the Court not to consider its abortion precedents in the 
instant case because the “history of discrimination against women, justify a 
different standard of review . . . .”229  The amici apparently feared that the 
close link between the right to an abortion and a right to physician-assisted 
suicide would potentially weaken the pro-choice position.230  Therefore, 
the amici supported respondents.  Reproductive and women’s rights groups 
attempted to instruct the Court about externalities beyond the physician-
assisted suicide context.  These groups were also partaking in 
counteractive lobbying to offset the efforts of the right to life amici. 
d.  Gay Rights and AIDS Advocacy Organizations 
Constituencies that perceived themselves as disproportionately 
affected by the Court’s decision, such as gay rights and AIDS advocacy 
organizations, also supported respondents.231  In a brief submitted by the 
Gay Men’s Health Crisis and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
the amici argued that the right to end one’s life was a fundamental liberty 
interest.232  The brief contained statements from prominent individuals with 
disabilities and terminal illnesses and also marshaled the argument that 
denial of the right to assistance in dying denies people with terminal 
illnesses equal protection under the law.233  Besides making legal 
                                                                                                                
227 Brief for the National Women’s Health Network and Northwest Women’s Law Center as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709341. 
228 Id. at 22. 
229 Brief for the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 1–7, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708943. 
230 See id. at 1 (“The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy . . . protects the right and ability of 
women around the world to obtain the full range of reproductive health services including abortion, 
contraception and new reproductive technologies.”). 
231 There is also the prospect that these groups are seeking broad liberty interests in the instant 
case to impact other contexts. 
232 See Brief for Gay Men’s Health Crisis and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12–13, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 
711205.  
233 See id. at 24 app. (including statements of attorney Evan A. Davis and writer and historian 
Hugh Gregory Gallagher, both of whom became disabled at a young age). 
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arguments, the amici made emotive and signaling arguments to the Court. 
e.  Mental Health Professionals 
A coalition brief of mental health professionals asserted that “[a]s 
mental health professionals, we have no interest in ‘promoting’ assisted 
suicide.  Our interest lies, instead, in the promotion of patient 
autonomy . . . and in the sound development of the law to that end.”234  
Despite an espoused ambivalence about physician-assisted suicide, the 
amici concluded that the Supreme Court should uphold the lower court 
decision on patient autonomy grounds.  Similarly, a national medical 
student organization and a group of distinguished medical professionals 
argued that physician-assisted suicide should be an available option to 
competent terminally ill patients.235  In contrast to the AMA brief that 
focused on a physician’s ethical obligation to their patient, amici for 
respondents focused on patient autonomy arguing that “[t]he principle of 
patient autonomy is equally central to medical ethics and to defining the 
physician’s role in end-of-life decisions.”236  These briefs in favor of 
respondents along with the briefs supporting petitioner signaled to the 
Court the split in the medical community and the health profession. 
3.  Neutral Amici 
Not all amici support a particular party; neutral advocacy is also an 
option.  In Glucksberg, Choice in Dying, Inc.237 took no legal position, but 
instead sought “to establish an empirically based framework by which 
these important issues may be considered . . . .”238  Although the 
organization’s name suggests otherwise, Choice in Dying presented 
themselves to the Court as a neutral amicus participating to clarify 
misconceptions surrounding physician-assisted suicide.  The brief’s 
presentation was neutral in that it cited statistics and observations that 
could be used by respondents, petitioners, but most importantly by the 
Court in reviewing the appellate court’s decision. 
4.  The Glucksberg Court’s Use of Amicus Briefs 
The majority opinion in Glucksberg cited the United States’ amicus 
brief and the states’ coalition brief in its discussion of implicated state 
interests.239  Also, the opinion cited several briefs in a footnote to express 
                                                                                                                
234 Brief for Washington State Psychological Association et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 29, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708960. 
235 Brief for the American Medical Student Association and a Coalition of Distinguished Medical 
Professionals as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–4, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 
1996 WL 709332. 
236 Id. at 13. 
237 Brief for Choice in Dying, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 
1996 WL 656277. 
238 Id. at 1. 
239 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–31. 
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the Court’s recognition of the skepticism surrounding physician-assisted 
suicide and the potential slippery slope that will follow once a categorical 
ban is lifted.240  Although the references to amicus briefs are minimal in the 
opinion, this is not the best way to gauge their importance.  Supreme Court 
Justices may draw from multiple types of information that come to the 
Court’s attention via amici. 
B.  Roper v. Simmons 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether it was permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the Constitution to execute a juvenile offender who was under the age of 
eighteen when he committed a capital crime.241  The Supreme Court held 
(5–4) in favor of respondent, Christopher Simmons, concluding that the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty 
on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were 
committed.  In total, there were eighteen amicus briefs submitted at the 
merits stage.  These briefs were submitted in support of petitioner (i.e., 
Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center), and 
respondent (i.e., Christopher Simmons).  The overwhelming majority of 
briefs (sixteen, in fact) were in support of respondent.  The briefs came 
from a diverse range of parties including professional associations, 
international organizations and leaders, religious organizations, child 
advocacy groups, legal organizations and governmental amici.  The 
Simmons amici opted for coalition briefs, which explains some of the 
difference in the number of briefs compared to Washington v. Glucksberg. 
1.  Amici Supporting Petitioners 
Only two amici supported petitioners and sought to reverse the 
decision made by the Missouri Supreme Court ruling the execution of 
juveniles under the age of eighteen unconstitutional.  These amici fell into 
two categories: governmental amici and legal organizations. 
a.  Governmental Amici 
The states of Alabama, Delaware, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and 
Virginia submitted a brief arguing against a bright line rule forbidding 
executions for offenders under the age of eighteen.242  The amici asserted 
                                                                                                                
240 Id. at 732 n.23. 
241 Christopher Simmons, at age seventeen, committed a brutal murder.  Simmons v. Roper, 112 
S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003).  Following a jury trial, Simmons was convicted and sentenced to death.  
Id.  Simmons, while on death row, filed a new petition for post conviction relief, arguing that the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002), established that the 
Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under the age of eighteen when the crime 
was committed.  Id.  The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and set aside Simmons’ death sentence.  Id. 
at 413.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004). 
242 Brief for the States of Alabama, Delaware, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Virginia as Amici 
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that, based upon their experience, there is no basis to categorically exempt 
juveniles below the age of eighteen from execution.  Specifically, amici 
argued that there is a distinction between juveniles at ages sixteen and 
seventeen compared to the mentally retarded.  Thus, a sixteen- or 
seventeen-year-old’s culpability should be an individualized determination.  
To demonstrate this, amici provided brutal descriptions of crimes 
committed by juveniles at the age of sixteen and seventeen to illustrate that 
certain juvenile offenders demonstrate culpability.243  Here amici relied on 
legal, signaling, and emotive arguments to persuade the Court to overturn 
the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision. 
b.  Legal Organizations 
The other amici supporting petitioner, Justice for All Alliance, made 
similar arguments against a bright line prohibition and asked for 
individualized determinations of culpability for juveniles below the age of 
eighteen.244  Whereas legal organizations played a minor role as amici 
supporting petitioner, they played a much greater role as amici supporting 
respondents. 
2.  Amici Supporting Respondent 
a.  Governmental Amici 
As a general matter, governmental amici made significant use of legal 
and signaling arguments.  A coalition brief of states argued that there is a 
legislative consensus (i.e., thirty-one states plus the Federal Government 
Bar) against imposing the death penalty against juvenile defenders under 
the age of eighteen.245  Governmental amici also identified trends toward 
stricter juvenile justice laws that expose juveniles to adult criminal 
sanctions, yet still draw a distinction with respect to capital punishment.246 
                                                                                                                
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 
865268 [hereinafter Alabama et al. Brief]. 
243 See id. at 4–14 (providing case studies demonstrating this phenomenon). 
244 See Brief for Justice for All Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Roper, 543 
U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 865269 [hereinafter Justice for All Brief] (“[T]he Court [can]not 
group juveniles together as a class but rather [must] acknowledge that they are all different with respect 
to their experience, maturity, intelligence, and moral culpability.”).  The Justice for All Alliance is a 
victim support organization advocating for change in the criminal justice system to ensure that victim’s 
rights are considered.  Id. at n.2. 
245 See Brief for New York, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, and West 
Virginia as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2 n.1, 3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 
WL 1636449 (“This legislative consensus . . . do[es] not permit the death penalty under any 
circumstances.”). 
246 See id. at 18 (“[N]umerous states have drastically toughened their treatment of juvenile 
offenders by lowering the age at which these offenders may be tried and sentenced as adults.  At the 
same time, however, there has been a trend in many of these states toward explicitly prohibiting 
execution of these offenders.”). 
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b.  Non-Governmental Amici 
  i.  International Organizations 
International organizations and actors expressed a keen interest in the 
juvenile capital punishment issue.  A coalition brief from the European 
Union and other members of the international community signaled the 
international consensus against the execution of juvenile offenders.247  A 
group of esteemed Nobel Peace Prize Recipients, including former U.S. 
President James Earl Carter, asked the Court to consider the opinion of the 
international community in deciding the question of whether the death 
penalty for juveniles under the age of eighteen was constitutional.248  The 
brief asserted that a bar of the juvenile death penalty has jus cogens status 
in international law and referenced a number of international treaties and 
instruments barring the death penalty for juveniles.249  The brief also 
signaled international consensus on the juvenile death penalty and 
portrayed the United States as an anomaly in the international 
community.250  The amici cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent for 
considering international norms when reaching a decision.251  In addition, 
the Nobel Prize winners made use of externality arguments, asserting that 
the United States’ sanctioning of juvenile executions would undermine the 
leverage the United States government would have to influence other 
countries to improve their own human rights record.252 
Similarly, a brief from Former U.S. Diplomats argued that continuing 
the administration of the death penalty against juveniles could negatively 
impact the United States government’s standing in the international 
community.253  This brief highlighted the condemnation the United States 
has received from international bodies like the United Nations concerning 
the execution of juvenile offenders.254  The brief also articulated the 
diplomatic isolation the United States could face given the consensus in the 
world community, even among nations with poor human rights records, on 
                                                                                                                
247 See Brief for European Union, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1–3, Roper, 
543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter EU Brief].  Admittedly, the EU and other European countries 
mentioned herein are indeed governmental entities.  For simplification purposes, this Article classifies 
these entities as non-governmental because they are non-domestic. 
248 See Brief for President James Earl Carter, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
1–3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Carter Brief]. 
249 Id. at 6–7, 19. 
250 Id. at 9–10. 
251 Id. at 20. 
252 Id. at 27–29. 
253 See Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, 
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Diplomats Brief] (“The continuation of this practice by 
a few states in the United States strains diplomatic relations with close American allies, increases 
America’s diplomatic isolation, and impairs important U.S. foreign policy interests at a critical 
time . . . .”).  The named diplomats also filed an amicus brief in Atkins v. Virginia.  536 U.S. 304 
(2002) (holding that execution of persons with mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment). 
254 Id. at 8–13. 
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the prohibition of juvenile executions.255  Another brief from a coalition of 
human rights organizations highlighted the historical influence of 
international law and the United Kingdom on the formation of the United 
States Constitution, particularly the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and 
unusual punishment clause.256  This brief made several legal arguments as 
to why the Supreme Court should consider international law and norms 
(i.e., embrace comparativism) when considering evolving standards of 
decency under the Eighth Amendment. 
ii.  Professional Organizations 
Professional organizations, particularly medical and psychological 
organizations, relied heavily on empirical data, social science, and 
research-based arguments.  The AMA and other organizations filed a 
coalition brief that provided scientific evidence showing the cognitive and 
physiological differences between adolescents and adults and how these 
differences support not extending the death penalty to juveniles.257  
Similarly, another coalition brief, filed in part by the American 
Psychological Association, cited research findings on adolescent 
psychological development and thought processes that, in the amici’s view, 
undermined the rationale for extending the death penalty to juveniles.258  
The brief also cited research that sentencing proceedings did not 
adequately account for the mitigating factor of adolescence.259 
iii.  Religious Organizations 
Religious organizations also participated as amici, citing their unique 
qualifications for addressing moral and ethical issues.  The Conference of 
Catholic Bishops and Other Religious Organizations filed a coalition brief 
asserting the relevance of religious communities’ views (e.g., Jewish, 
Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, etc.) on the imposition of the death penalty 
and evolving standards of decency.260  This coalition brief signaled to the 
                                                                                                                
255 See id. at 14–25 (“If these trends continue, the United States will soon stand alone as the only 
country in the world that endorses the regular execution of juvenile offenders as part of its ordinary 
criminal justice system.”). 
256 Brief for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 2–3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Roper, England and 
Wales] (“[A]mici consider the history of treatment of juveniles in the United Kingdom, as well as the 
status of the internal law and practice with respect to the juvenile death penalty, to be of particular 
interest to this Court.”). 
257 See Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
4–16, 21, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“These behavioral differences are pervasive and 
scientifically documented.”). 
258 See Brief for American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 2–3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“The unformed nature of adolescent character 
makes execution of 16- and 17-year-olds fall short of the purposes this Court has articulated for capital 
punishment.”). 
259 Id. at 16–30. 
260 Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and other Religious Organizations as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1–2, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).  Another Catholic 
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Court the consistent view from various religious faiths on the issue of 
juvenile execution, despite differing views on crime and punishment. 
iv.  Legal Organizations 
Legal organizations supporting the respondent had an active presence 
as amici.  The ABA made legal arguments against extending the death 
penalty to juveniles as well as acknowledging the growing national and 
international consensus.261  The ABA took no position with respect to the 
death penalty as a general matter.  However, the ABA noted its opposition 
to extending capital punishment to juvenile offenders.262  In a coalition 
brief filed by the NAACP LDF and other legal organizations, amici 
highlighted the racial disparities connected with the imposition of the death 
penalty to juveniles.263  For example, the brief cited statistics indicating 
that over fifty percent of juveniles executed since 1973 were either black or 
Latino.264  The National Legal Aid and Defender Association made legal 
arguments throughout its brief, concluding with the use of emotive 
persuasion.265  The conclusion quoted a letter from a former juvenile 
offender, who, during the 1980s was sentenced to death, but later re-
sentenced to life in prison.266  This type of emotive argumentation is 
perhaps best suited for amici rather than the immediate parties.  If similar 
arguments are made by the immediate parties, they could potentially 
stigmatize a party.267  Although a number of briefs in the legal organization 
category were prone to repetition,268 several briefs raised ancillary legal 
issues such as procedural deficiencies to sway the Court.  For example, the 
Coalition for Juvenile Justice Brief argued that juveniles are “less able to 
assist counsel, more prone to making false confessions, and more likely to 
be wrongfully convicted or wrongfully sentenced to death.”269  Robust 
amicus participation by legal organizations in support of respondent 
                                                                                                                
organization, the United States Catholic Conference filed a brief in Washington v. Glucksberg.  See 
Brief for the United States Catholic Conference et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650919. 
261 See Brief for American Bar Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2–5, 16, 
20–21, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“[T]he United States is virtually alone among the world’s 
nations in permitting the execution of juvenile offenders, a factor this Court [has] considered in [the 
past].” (internal citations omitted)). 
262 Id. at 3. 
263 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 3–5, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633). 
264 Id. at 10. 
265 See Brief for National Legal Aid and Defender Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 27–29, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“Amid the legal arguments and counter 
arguments made in cases such as th[ese], it is easy to lose track of the truth[,] that these cases affect real 
lives.”). 
266 Id. at 28–30. 
267 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.b. 
268 See, e.g., Brief for Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Roper, 543 
U.S. 551 (No. 03-633). 
269 Brief for Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Roper, 
543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633). 
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reinforces the claim that amici act as a surrogate for vulnerable groups. 
v.  Child Advocacy and Victim’s Rights Groups 
Participation by child advocacy and victims groups reflected several 
argumentation styles such as legal, signaling, policy and counteractive 
lobbying.  The coalition brief of the Juvenile Law Center, included over 
fifty entities who advocate on behalf of juveniles and children.270  Here, the 
amici made legal and policy arguments, as well as signaling widespread 
opposition to the juvenile death penalty.271  A brief from Murder Victims’ 
Families for Reconciliation asserted an argument rejecting the idea of 
using victim’s rights as a basis to justify the death penalty for juveniles.272  
Here, the amici engaged in a form of counteractive lobbying by asserting 
that victims are not monolithic in their views of capital punishment.273  
This brief countered arguments made by another victim’s rights group in 
support of petitioner.274 
3.  The Simmons Court’s use of Amicus Briefs 
a.  The Majority Opinion’s References to Amici 
The majority opinion in Roper v. Simmons had several direct 
references to amici.  Moreover, information submitted via amici figured 
prominently into the Court’s analysis.  The Court acknowledged amici-
supporting respondents in several areas.  The Court first referenced 
respondent’s amici in its discussion of the key differences between 
juveniles under eighteen and adults, which demonstrate that juvenile 
offenders “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders.”275  Yet, respondent’s amici were most prominent in the Court’s 
discussion of international legal and social norms.276  The Court noted that 
                                                                                                                
270 See Brief for Juvenile Law Center et. al as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper, 543 
U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1660637. 
271 Id. at 19–20. 
272 See Brief for Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 3–4, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1588549 (“There is a prevailing 
assumption in our society that surviving family members of homicide victims want and need the death 
penalty in order to feel that justice has been served.  In fact, victims come to this devastating 
experience with diverse beliefs, life backgrounds, and needs, and their response to the horror of having 
a family member murdered is as varied and diverse as the victims themselves.”). 
273 Id. at 3–4. 
274 Compare id. at 3–5 (“By invoking victims’ rights in support of the death penalty, [The Justice 
for All Alliance] promotes the inaccurate assumption that all victims believe that the execution of 
offenders is justice for the crime.”), with Justice For All Brief, supra note 244, at 12 (“[C]ommon sense 
dictates that fifteen-year-olds are capable of being deterred from committing first-degree murder if they 
know they would receive the ultimate punishment.”). 
275 Roper, 543 U.S. at 553. 
276 See EU Brief, supra note 247, at 12–13 (relying on amicus study to evaluate international 
execution practices); Carter Brief, supra note 248, at 9 (utilizing amicus participation in finding that 
“the United States [is] the only nation . . . that has not committed itself by treaty to bar the death 
penalty for offenses committed by persons under 18”); Diplomats Brief, supra note 253, at 7 (“Given 
the near unanimity of law and practice against executing juvenile offenders worldwide, amici believe 
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“[r]espondent and his amici have submitted, and petitioner does not 
contest, that only seven countries other than the United States have 
executed juvenile offenders since 1990 . . . .”277  The Court also cited the 
Brief for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al., 
when it acknowledged the “opinion of the world community” and the 
“overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty.”278  The Court, however, did not limit it references to respondent’s 
amici with whom the majority agreed.  The Court also acknowledged and 
addressed the arguments raised by state governmental amici for petitioner 
against a categorical exclusion for juveniles from the death penalty.279 
b.  The Dissenting Opinions of Justices O’Connor and Scalia 
Perhaps the most interesting discussion involving issues and 
information submitted via amici involved the two dissenting opinions of 
Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia that discussed the relevance of 
international law and expressed some skepticism concerning arguments 
presented via amici.  Justice O’Connor criticized the majority opinion 
asserting: 
Because I do not believe that a genuine national 
consensus against the juvenile death penalty has yet 
developed, and because I do not believe the Court’s moral 
proportionality argument justifies a categorical, age-based 
constitutional rule, I can assign no such confirmatory role to 
the international consensus described by the Court.  In short, 
the evidence of an international consensus does not alter my 
determination that the Eighth Amendment does not, at this 
time, forbid capital punishment of 17-year-old murderers in 
all cases.280 
Justice O’Connor acknowledged the relevance of international law and 
norms to the Court’s determination of contemporary standards of decency.  
Yet Justice O’Connor expressed the opinion that international law has a 
confirmatory role to play that does not trump domestic standards, values, 
and consensus as expressed through the actions of the Nation’s 
legislatures. 
On the other hand, Justice Scalia’s dissent took a more radical 
                                                                                                                
that the current practice by a few states in the United States violates customary international law . . . .”); 
Roper, England and Wales, supra note 256, at 13–14 (“Numerous treaties, declarations, and 
pronouncements by international bodies, as well as the laws of the vast majority of nations, are 
evidence of [this trend].”).  The Court specifically cited these briefs.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 576. 
277 Roper, 543 U.S. at 577. 
278 Id. at 578. 
279 See id. at 570–74 (“In concluding that neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate 
justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders, we cannot deny or overlook the 
brutal crimes too many juvenile offenders have committed.” (internal citation omitted)). 
280 Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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stance―asserting that international law and opinion had no relevance to 
the Court’s inquiry: 
The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our 
Nation’s moral standards—and in the course of discharging 
that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from 
the views of foreign courts and legislatures.  Because I do not 
believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any 
more than the meaning of other provisions of our 
Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of 
five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I 
dissent.281 
Justice Scalia did not limit his criticism to input from international 
amici.  He challenged the methodology and reliability of scientific studies 
particularly those submitted by the American Psychological Association.282  
Scalia further added: 
Given the nuances of scientific methodology and conflicting 
views, courts—which can only consider the limited evidence 
on the record before them—are ill equipped to determine 
which view of science is the right one.  Legislatures “are 
better qualified to weigh and ‘evaluate the results of 
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and 
with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the 
courts.’”283 
Justice Scalia did not support a categorical ban because he was not 
convinced that there were not individuals under age eighteen who were 
able to appreciate the nature of their crimes.  To highlight this point, he 
ironically cited the amicus brief from the States of Alabama, Delaware, 
Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Virginia, which provided examples of 
“monstrous acts” of murder committed by individuals under eighteen.284 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Roper highlight the tension 
between the Court’s role as an independent body and a political actor.  
They also reflect the inclusionary function of amicus participation. 
C.  Political Symbolism as reflected in Glucksberg and Simmons 
The in-depth analysis of the amici arguments in Glucksberg and 
Simmons provided herein further reveals how amicus participation 
                                                                                                                
281 Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
282 Id. at 617–18 (“[T]he American Psychological Association (APA), which claims in this case 
that scientific evidence shows persons under 18 lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their 
decisions, has previously taken precisely the opposite position before this very Court.”). 
283 Id. at 618 (internal citations omitted) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
284 Id. at 618–19; see also Alabama et al. Brief, supra note 242, at 9–10 (chronicling one such act 
of violence). 
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resembles a discursive debate and dialogue among multiple 
constituencies.285  The Court also participates in these ongoing 
discussions―sometimes directly via its published opinions and, at other 
times, as a mere listener.  The Court’s listening function is particularly 
important and should not be discounted.286  Unsuccessful, but 
acknowledged, arguments and perspectives from amici, at a minimum, 
create the impression that Court decisions are the result of vigorous debate 
and reasoning.287  In Glucksberg and Simmons, amicus briefs came from a 
wide variety of amici reflecting divergent viewpoints.  Without the 
inclusion offered by amicus participation, many of the amici and the 
interests they represented would have been excluded from the Court’s 
consideration despite being impacted by the scope of the Court’s ruling.  
Exclusion, in this instance, would engender negative consequences for the 
Court’s legitimacy.  The presence of an open deliberative forum not only 
increases the prospect of more balanced and perhaps better substantive 
outcomes, but also enhances the Court’s institutional legitimacy 
irrespective of a particular decision or outcome.288  Current Supreme Court 
rules favoring broad or “open door” participation implicitly acknowledge 
that the Court’s job is not limited to considering the discrete interests of the 
immediate parties.  The “Supreme Court cannot perceive itself as an 
isolated institution handing down rules from its pedestal in Washington, 
but instead it should see itself as one actor among many in the midst of a 
long-term colloquy.”289  Court decisions like Glucksberg and Simmons, 
although creating a degree of finality for the immediate parties, are only 
part of an ongoing dialogue between the Court, the public, and their 
representatives—and not the final decree.290  Amicus participation 
symbolizes the integrated function of the Supreme Court in American 
society.291 
                                                                                                                
285 See discussion supra Parts VI.A.–B. 
286 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Costs of Attitudes, 95 YALE L.J. 1043, 1062 (1986) (reviewing 
GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A 
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM (1985)) (“[H]onesty is usually the best policy, and that those whose beliefs do 
not prevail in a conflict should be made to feel that they remain full and respected members of the 
polity.”). 
287 CALABRESI, supra note 286, at 90–91 (asserting how some conflicts are best addressed when 
legal structures allow for recognition or sympathy of various beliefs). 
288 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 68, at 42. 
289 John Moeller, Alexander M. Bickel: Toward a Theory of Politics, 47 J. POL. 113, 133–34 
(1985). 
290 See id. at 134; see also Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the 
Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 575 (2007) (describing courts as catalysts 
versus the traditional conception as norm elaborators and enforcers). 
291 The amicus brief continues to serve as a “catch-all device for dealing with some of the 
difficulties presented by the common law system of adversary proceeding.”  Krislov, supra note 13, at 
720. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article does not offer a specific policy or rule revision, but 
instead recognizes the benefits of preserving the status quo, i.e., broad 
amicus participation before the Supreme Court.  Open door access to amici 
helps preserve the Court’s institutional legitimacy among varied 
stakeholders without significantly undermining the Court’s independence.  
Amicus participation dispels external criticism that the Court is detached 
and indifferent to the public.  In the absence of a restrictive rule governing 
amicus participation, the Court has developed its own filtering mechanisms 
for analyzing amicus briefs and provided informal guidance to potential 
filers concerning the Court’s preferences.  Ultimately, criticisms of broad 
participation are outweighed by the resulting legitimacy gains.  The 
Court’s function as a quasi-representative institution is neither without 
tension nor imperfection.  But, in the end, this function is unavoidable. 
